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SECTION I 
SUMMARY 
This document is the Final Report  of a reliability analysis of a 
thermal-vacuum prototype power conditioning and control sys tem de- 
veloped during the hardware phase of JPL Contract No. 951144. The 
sys t em which makes use of modularized power conditioning techniques 
employs par t ia l  redundancy where increased  reliability is required.  
The reliability analysis of this sys tem (with no modifications 
f r o m  the prototype configuration) resul ts  in a total probability of suc-  
c e s s  of 0. 85 for  a 10, 000 hour mission. 
a r e a s  of the sys tem where substantial reliabil i ty improvements can be 
made with only minor changes i n  c i rcui t  design and virtually no penalty 
in  sys t em weight. 
flight model optimized for SERT I1 requirements  has yielded the sub- 
stantially higher reliability of 0 .96 for  the complete sys t em for  a 
10, 000 hour mission. 
This analysis has  helped define 
The application of these improvements to a proposed 
The analysis has  been based on appropriate mathematical  
models,  the best  available sources of fa i lure  ra te  data, and detailed 
component s t r e s s  calculations. Every attempt has  been made to make 
this study as thorough and exact as possible. 
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SECTION I1 
INTRODUCTION 
A program was initiated at Hughes Aircraf t  Company in  
Februa ry  1965 under contract  to the J e t  Propulsion Laboratory to 
determine the feasibility of so la r -e lec t r ic  propulsion for  unmanned 
interplanetary missions. '  Included i n  this program was the devel- 
opment and t e s t  of a prototype ion engine system' including thrus te r ,  
feed system, and power conditioning and controls.  
The power conditioning and control sys tem employed made 
use of a unique modular approach in which, the electr ical  outputs 
of the various supplies required to operate the ion engine and feed 
sys t ems  were  generated by adding the outputs of individual low 
power, low voltage modules. This approach was chosen over the 
m o r e  conventional techniques because i t  offered promise of lighter 
weights and higher efficiencies, and because i t  appeared more  accept- 
able to the requirements  of power and voltage matching which a r e  
unique to so l a r  powered e lec t r ic  propulsion missions.  
evaluation, one seeming disadvantage of the modular approach was 
the l a r g e r  total number of components required resulting in  an  ap- 
parent  lower sys tem reliability. However, a more  detailed analy- 
sis indicated that any disadvantage associated with the grea te r  num- 
b e r  of components was more  than offset by the ability to provide 
par t ia l  redundancy where necessary.  
c reas ing  of total sys t em reliability to levels consistent with space 
sys t ems  could be accomplished with the modular approach a t  weight 
penalt ies far less than would be incurred with the more  conventional 
types of power conditioning. 
Upon cu r so ry  
Thus, i t  was felt  that the in- 
'Solar Powered Elec t r ic  Propulsion Spacecraft  Study, Final  Report ,  
2Developrnent and Tes t  of an  Ion Engine System Employing Modular 
JPL Contract No. 951144, December 1965. 
Power Conditioning, Final  Report, JPL Contract No. 951 144 
September 1966. 3 
This report  details the resu l t s  of a reliabil i ty analysis of two 
ion engine power conditioning and control sys tems designed to operate  
a 15 cm Hg bombardment thrus te r  and its associated feed system. 
These systems are: (1) a thermal-vacuum prototype developed and 
tested under JPL contract  and ( 2 )  a proposed optimized flight con- 
figuration for a 1. 2 kW SERT I1 engine. 
It is important to note that the thermal-vacuum prototype was 
designed to  meet two miss ion  objectives ( f i r s t ,  in terplanetary appli- 
cations and, secondarily, SERT I1 requirements)  and therefore  was 
not optimized fo r  a specific mission, The p r i m a r y  consideration in  
the design was the demonstration of all c i rcu i t  techniques which might 
be required to operate ion propulsion sys t ems  which were  suitable fo r  
Solar- Electric spacecraf t  and which might employ individual th rus te rs  
with power levels up to  six kilowatts. 
objective, the total number of power conditioning modules employed 
were grea te r  than that actually required to operate  the thrus te r  
(originally a 2 0  cm 
with a 15 c m  
and tes t  program. However, this "over capability" made possible the 
demonstration of c i rcu i t  techniques such as dc adding, a c  adding, 
incremental  regulation, continuous regulation and control, redundancy, 
compensation for  s o l a r  voltage changes in t ransi t ,  power matching to 
so la r  a r r a y ,  e tc .  
In o r d e r  to  sat isfy this design 
Hughes engine which was subsequently replaced 
LeRC engine) used during the hardware development 
A second objective of the prototype sys t em was to provide 
power for  the 15 c m  LeRC engine under simulated ear th-orbi t  condi- 
tions. 
between 40 and 60 volts r a the r  than the 6 0  to 100 volt range considered 
desirable  for  a n  interplanetary mission. Also, extensive overr ides  
were provided i n  the control c i rcu i t ry  designed to protect  the engine 
and keep i t  running even if not a t  maximum performance. This eon- 
t ro l  mode is in contrast  to the optimizing of engine performance which 
would be required for  a n  interplanetary mission. 
The solar  a r r a y  output voltage level  was thus established at 
4 
c 
In contrast  to the prototype system, (with i t s  overdesign for  the 
15 c m  engine and contradictory constraints of an interplanetary mission 
and an  ea r th  orbi t  application) the optimized sys tem has  been designed 
to supply the 1200 watts now known to be maximum for  the 15 c m  engine 
The new sys t em uses  a grounded feed system, a minimum number of 
modLiles, and additional feed system and control c i rcu i t ry  redundancy. 
The substantial  increase  in reliability (96% versus  85%) of the optimized 
sys t em has been obtained pr imari ly  a s  a resu l t  of additional redundancy 
in  the feed sys tem and the control c i rcui t ry .  At the s a m e  time, the 
weight of the sys tem has been reduced pr imar i ly  through the use of 
fewer  modules 
The reliability analysis of both sys tems has  been made for a 
miss ion  duration of 10, 000 hours,  such as required fo r  a Mars  t ransi t ,  
and has  been made with a "worst-case" assumption of sys tem fai lure  in 
event of any te lemetry failure o r  any loss in  regulation o r  control. 
te lemetry represents  a significant fraction of the total c i rcui t ry ,  and 
s ince there  are many paral le l  information paths to obtain data on essen-  
tial engixe performance, the resultant f igure is quite conservative.  
Similarly,  satisfactory,  i f  not optimum, performance may be obtained 
f r o m  the engine in  spite of loss of regulation in  seve ra l  supplies. Thus, 
any degraded mode has  been defined (for  analysis purposes)  a s  a sys tem 
fai lure  again providing a conservative est imate  of sys t em reliability. 
Since 
The approach to the study presented in this r epor t  is in  keeping 
with s tandard (and accepted) reliability analyses.  F i r s t ,  functional 
d iagrams of each of the power supplies a r e  presented along with an  evalu- 
ation of a l l  possible fa i lure  modes; second, mathematical  models, which 
combine the elements of the functional diagrams in  such way that the 
fai lure  modes can be quantitatively a s ses sed ,  a r e  developed fo r  each 
supply; third, fa i lure  ra tes  for  all components employed a r e  established 
and, finally, a numerical  evaluation of the reliability of the complete sys -  
tem is made. 
these s teps .  
The sections which follow present  the details  of each of 
5 
SECTION I11 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS/THERMAL-VACUUM PROTOTYPE 
F o r  the purpose of this analysis the power conditioning and con- 
t ro l  sys t em was divided into seven basic  subsystem blocks as shown i n  
Fig.  1. 
block diagrams which specified in de tail the various functions provided 
by that par t icular  subsys tem,  From these functional c i rcu i t  diagrams,  
the fai lure  modes associated with a given subsystem were  established. 
Based  on these fai lure  modes, reliability block diagrams were  drawn 
and, subsequently, appropriate mathematical  models were  developed. 
By inser t ing into the resulting mathematical  expressions established 
fai lure  r a t e s  for  the components employed in  the circui t ry ,  numerical  
resu l t s  were finally obtained for  the reliabil i ty of the complete system. 
Each of these subsystems was in  turn  subdivided into circui t  
Each of the s teps  of the reliability analysis outlined above will 
However, p r io r  to be descr ibed i n  detail  in the following paragraphs.  
this detailed description, a general discussion of the development of 
the mathematical  models and the establishment of component fa i lure  
r a t e s  will be presented. 
A. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Since there is a choice to  be made in the approaches employed 
in  developing the mathematical  models and in  establishing component 
fa i lure  ra tes ,  a brief discussion of these a r e a s  is appropriate before 
proceeding with the over-al l  analysis 
1. Ma the mati  c a1 Models 
The mathematlcal  models f r o m  which the reliabil i ty of 
the sys t em can be quantitatively determined can be derived rigorously 
(i. e.  exact models) o r  approximate solutions can be found, 
vantages to using the approximate models a r e  threefold: 
velopment of each model is  l e s s  complex, ( 2 )  each t e r m  in  the expres-  
sion represents  a given fai lure  mode providing a more  obvious co r re l a -  
tion between the mathematics and the physical situation ( a l so  facilitating 
The ad- 
( 1 )  the de 
7 
N 
I 
h 
n 
I- 
W 
a 
a 
W 
I- 
W 
I 
W 
0 
0 
I 
I- " 
0 
1 
5 
W 
m 1 
1 
3 
n 
n 
3 
v) 
0 
a 
E 
(d 
GI 
M 
cd 
24 
v 
0 
z 
z; 
E 
Q) 
U 
4 
M 
iT( 
I 
' 1  
1 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
d 
0 
V 
M 
0 
k 
Q) 
3 
ct 
I 
1 .  
I 
8 
1 
I 
I 
I 
8 
I: 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
m 
al terat ion of the expression itself, i f  c i rcu i t  changes a r e  made),  and 
( 3 )  in general ,  the final expression is minimized in length and com- 
plexity thereby simplifying the numerical  calculations. However, i f  
this approach is to be used, the validity of the approximation must  be 
established. 
During this study exact mathematical models were derived for  
each  of the seven subsystem blocks. 
given i n  Appendix A. 
models,  approximate expressions were sought which would yield e s -  
sentially the s a m e  numerical  results.  
approximate method employed, the redundant portions of the Beam 
Supply and the Cathode Heater were chosen a s  tes t  ca ses ,  
supplies typify the two types of redundancy used throughout the system. 
Upon substitution of failure r a t e s  in  the exact and approximate expres-  
sions,  the reliabil i t ies of these subsystems were found to be: 
The result ing expressions a r e  
Subsequent to the development of these rigorous 
To establish the validity of the 
These 
Beam Supply 
R = 0.9996 - exact expression 
R = 0.99956 - approximate expression 
Cathode Heater 
R = 0.9998 - exact expression 
R = 0.9999 - approximate express ion .  
Note that the numerical  resul ts  quoted a r e  intended to apply only to the 
redundant inver te rs  and their  failure sensing and switching mechanisms. 
The numerical  resul ts  above indicate disagreement  by only one 
p a r t  in  the fourth decimal place. 
insignificant i n  the final combination of the numerical  resul ts .  
reason,  i t  was concluded that approximate redundancy expressions could 
be used in the numerical  evaluation process .  
developed along with the discussion of the individual subsystem blocks 
in  the following sections. 
This  magnitude of difference is c lear ly  
F o r  this 
These expressions are 
9 
The principal factor  not included in the derivation of the approxi- 
mate expressions i s  the possibility of fa i lure  of the standby elements  
during the time they a r e  standing by waiting f o r  use.  
the numerical  resu l t s  obtained by the two methods indicated that consid- 
erat ion of this factor was not essent ia l  here .  
The closeness  of 
2. Component Fa i lure  Rates  
The mathematical  models discussed above a r e  composisd 
of elements which represent  the probability of cer ta in  modes of fa i lure  
occurring. In general ,  each of these elements  concerns itself w:th some 
u proup of C(..mpoiients. As such, the probability number fo r  that r:li:nent 
i s  c r i  3puted directly f r o m  a tabulation of the fai lure  r a t e s  for  that group 
of compciicnts. Calculations of this type require  that each corn:. ; :rrt be 
indiviciual1)- examined to determine i t s  opcrating s t r e s s  level. 
level is then used to dera te  the b a s i c  xili,rd ra te  i f  required.  
r a t e s  and s t r e s s  sheets  for  eacli eleiiiznt 0: tlid inathematical  mod ,1 , 
have been prepared and a r e  presented i n  Appendix B. 
ponent in  t c e  sys t em has been analyzed and a fai lure  r a t e  determined 
fo r  each. 
nections and external  connectors (where used) have been determined and 
entered into the calculation. 
‘I’:lL , t r ~ s s  
Fa i lure  
Thus, every  LorLi- 
Inaddition, fa i lure  ra tes  based on the number of solder  con- 
In some instances,  i t  has  been necessary  to consider m o r e  than 
one fai lure  mode of an  individual component. Since only total fa i lure  
r a t e s  a r e  available f rom the various data sources ,  some engineering 
judgement i s  required here .  F o r  example, experience indicates that 
diodes fail short  more  often than they fail open. 
ra te  has  been divided into 75% for  the shor ted  case  and 25% for  the 
open case .  In some cases  where i t  i s  not s o  easy  to draw on experience 
and yet i t  is necessary  to consider two possible fa i lure  modes,  the most  
conservative approach of assigning the total fa i lure  ra te  to both modes 
has  been used. 
Thus,  the total fa i lure  
10 
I‘ 
A multiple fa i lure  mode case which is worthy of discussion is 
that of the high voltage t ransformers  failing on insulation breakdown. 
Here ,  a total fa i lure  ra te  is available for  the t ransformer  and the 
question a r i s e s  a s  to what fraction of this ra te  should be used to a s s e s s  
the insulation failure mode. 
separa te  windings and an  open o r  shor t  fa i lure  of any of these windings 
o r  an  insulation fai lure  between any two of these windings i s  a possible 
fa i lure  mode. In addition, a very conservative safety factor was used 
in  the amount of high voltage insulation provided. 
t e s t s  performed on two of these t ransformers  indicated that insulation 
breakdown occurred a t  15 kV and a t  17  kV fo r  the tes t  samples .  Since 
the maximum operating voltage i s  only 3 .  5 kV (the average for  the 
Beam Supply s t r ing is approximately 2 kV), i t  can be seen that a la rge  
safety factor exists.  Considering that high voltage insulation fai lure  
was only one of s eve ra l  possible t ransformer  failure modes and that 
e x t r a  conservative design had been used in the amount of insulation, 
i t  was est imated that this fa i lure  mode should be evaluated using 1/10 
of the total t r ans fo rmer  fai lure  rate. 
degree  of conservatism, the f inalvalue of 1/7 of the total ra te  was 
used  in the calculation. 
A Beam Supply t ransformer  has four 
Destruction hi-pot 
In o rde r  to  provide one more  
Thus, the various sys tem failure modes a r e  quantitatively 
a s s e s s e d  pr imar i ly  by tabulating total component failure r a t e s  with 
those instances where multiple component fa i lure  modes a r e  concerned 
being t rea ted  as descr ibed above. 
11 
B. INDIVIDUAL SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS 
The quantitative evaluation of the reliabil i ty of each of the ma jo r  
subsystems were  based on the approximate mathematical  models  developed 
below and the failure r a t e s  and S t r e s s  Sheets provided in  Appendix B. The 
reliability block diagrams used throughout this  Section were  developed 
simply by considering the var ious failure modes assoc ia ted  with each 
subsystem. F r o m  these d iagrams,  the mathematical  modela a r e  derived. 
The numerical  resu l t s  of the reliabil i ty analysis a r e  summar ized  
in  F ig .  2. 
was found t o  be approximately 0 .  85 fo r  the thermal-vacuum prototype. 
Fu r the r  analysis has  shown that,  for  a flight system, this  number may be 
improved t o  g rea t e r  than 0 .  96 with no penalty in s ize  and weight. 
improvement i s  discussed in Section I V .  
Total sys tem probability of success  fo r  a 10, 000 hour  miss ion  
This 
1. Beam Supply 
The function and outputs provided by the Beam Supply subsystem a r e  
as follows: 
Function 
0 Provide power to  ion beam at t3500 VDC 
outputs 
e t3500 VDC beam power output 
t5 VDC voltage te lemetry 
t5 VDC curren t  te lemetry 
The functional c i rcui t  diagram of the Beam Supply is  given in  F ig .  3 .  
The seven operating plus two standby modules (nine total) are shown kith 
their  outputs added in a s e r i e s  s t r ing.  
diodes so  that a closed path is  always available even though the inver te r  
module has  failed.  
Each output is  effectively shunted by 
The logic sys tem is indicated a s  being contained in the 
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Fig .  3 .  Beam supply functional d iagram.  
8 
I 
I 
II 
I 
8 
I 
t 
I 
I 
t 
8 
I 
8 
I 
8 
I 
I 
I 
TYPE OF F A I L U R ~  
---------------- 
dashed line since this system is  located elsewhere.  
produces a low level logic signal for failure monitoring and these signals a r e  
used by the logic system to  command the standby modules. The logic system 
also commands the modules during init ial  s t a r t  up, overload t r ip ,  and rese t .  
(The logic system is considered separately in  the analysis and is  presented 
in  a la te r  sect ion.)  A high voltage f i l ter  i s  connected ac ross  the total  output 
to provide ripple smoothing and to provide voltage and cur ren t  te lemetry.  
Each inverter  module 
The fai lure  modes associated with the Beam Supply Subsystem as well 
as the effect of these fai lures  a re  given in Table I. 
TABLE I 
Beam Supply Fai lure  Modes 
2 .  Component f;lilu;e of any type in  
high voltage f i l ter  
3 .  Transformer  high voltage insula- 
tion breakdown 
4 .  Ser ies  string connections mechan- 
ica l  failure o r  short  to ground 
5 .  Fa i lure  monitor failure 
Indicates no failure when one 
has  occurred 
Indicates failure when one has  
nut: rr’cc:-u;.red 
a. 
b. 
RESULT 
I 
1. Standby module inser ted 
2.  Beam short  to ground, loss  of 
tdlkmetry; ,o,r indreased ripple 
-1 
3.  Beam short  to  ground 
4. No beam output 
5. Beam voltage change 
a.  Standby not inser ted  - 
beam volta.ge too low 
b. Standby inser ted - beam 
voltage too high 
Item 1 in  Table I does not represent a system failure since a standby module 
would automatically be inser ted.  I tems  2 through 5 ,  however, a r e  assumed 
in this  analysis to be fai lure  modes which resul t  i n  a loss  of the system. 
15 
This assumption is an example of the conservative approach used throughout 
the analysis since,  for  example, a change in  beam voltage o r  a loss  of 
te lemet ry  need not necessar i ly  be considered catastrophic.  
By considering the various failure modes l isted in  Table I,  it is  pos-  
sible to derive an approximate mathematical  model f rom which the re l ia -  
bility of the Beam Supply Subsystem can be quantitatively determined. In  
o rde r  t o  aid i n  the derivation of the model, the reliabil i ty block d iagram 
shown in Fig. 4 was constructed.  This diagram shows the relationships,  
f r o m  a reliability standpoint, among the fai lure  modes associated with 
the Beam Supply Subsystem. It a lso se rves  to  c lear ly  point out the a r e a s  
of redundancy incorporated in  the subsystem design. 
Referring to the reliability block diagram in  F i g .  4, it can be seen 
that the Beam Supply Subsystem is made up of s e r i e s  and standby redun- 
dant elements.  
duct of the reliabilities of each of the elements ,  the Beam Supply Sub- 
sys tem reliability is  given by 
Since the reliability of a s e r i e s  sys tem is simply the p r o -  
1 R( t )  = R R6 " R, * R8 * Rg 
1 where R 
a r e  the ser ies  elements as designated. 
i s  the reliability of the redundant portion and the remsining R . ' s  
1 
It can be shown that the reliability of a redundant system consisting 
of m operating and N standby modules is given by 
N - 
-mAt (mAt)L- 
R~ = e - 1  I .  L 
c r = O  
where A is the total  failure rate of an individual module (i. e .  , the sum of 
the failure rates of all the components within a single module).  In o rde r  to 
16 
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F i g .  4. Beam supply rel iabi l i ty  block d iagram.  
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generalize Eq. 2 to include the fai lure  monitors  and switching c i rcu i t s  
associated with each standby, assume that these units a r e  series elements  
with the redundant modules. Therefore ,  Eq. 2 becomes 
ni 
- m h t f  (mXt)r e -1 hMt 
r! R~ = e 
r =O 
where I = 0 when r = 0, 
1 = 1 when r = 1, 2 . . .N, and 
is the total  failure ra te  of an individual monitor and switching 
ci r cui t . 
By expanding Eq. 3, the reliability of the redundant portion can  be 
writ ten i n  t e r m s  of the R.'s shown in  Fig.  4 a s  follows 
1 
R1 = R1 t R2 R4 t R3 R5 
where by definition 
-7Xt R1 = e 
R, = e - (7  X t) 
- 7 A t  (7 A t )  
2 R3 = e 
- A  t M R4 = R5 = e 
Thus the t o t a l  Beam Supply reliability i s ,  in  t e r m s  of the R.ls, 
1 
R(t) = (R1 t R2 R4 t R3 R5) . R6 - R7 * R8 * R9 
The numerical  evaluations of the R . ' s  and R(t) can now be obtained by 
employing the appropriate Stress  Sheets and Table B-I provided in Appendix 
'B as follows: 
1 
R1 - From the Beam Module S t r e s s  Sheets the tc-tal failure ra te  - 
of this element is 
X = 0. 1625%/1000 h r s  
so that 
7A = l . l 3 8 % / 1 0 0 0 h r s  
and 
7 h t  = 0.01138/1000 h r s  x 10,000 h r s  = 0. 1138 . 
Finally 
= 0.8925.  - 7 X t  R1 = e 
RB - Similarily, - 
R2 = e -7h t (7Xt )  = 0. 1016 
R3 - and - 
19 
R4 - F r o m  the Beam Fail Sensing S t r e s s  Sheets the total  failure 
- 
rate of this element is  
1 = 0.0195%/1000hrs  
and 
k t  = C .  O O O l ~ 5 / l O O O  h r s  x 1 0 , 0 0 0  h r s  = G. 60195 
so that 
= 0.9980 R4 = e - A t  
R5 - a n d  
R5 = R4 = 0.9980 . 
The reliability of the redundant portion of the Beam Supply is  then 
R1 = R1 t R2 Rq t Rg R5 = 0.9996 
R6 - F r o m  the Beam High Voltage Filter Stress Sheets, the total  
- 
failure rate of th i s  element is 
A = 0.0258%/1000hrs  
so that 
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- Referring to the ea r l i e r  general  discussion on component 
failure r a t e s ,  the failure ra te  of the Beam t ransformer  is 
-
1 
7 1 = --x t ransforme? f r o m  T -ble €3-f 
where 
= 0. 02%/1000 hrs  ' transformer 
and, therefore ,  
02%/1000 h r s  = 0 . 0 0 2 ~ ~ / 1 0 0 0  h r s  
7 A =  
Since there  a r e  nine t ransformers ,  the total  fa i lure  rate of this 
element is 
9 h  = 0 . 0 2 6 ~ / 1 0 0 0  hrs  
Finally 
R7 
- 9 A t  e 0.9973 
R8 - The probability of obtaining an open circui t  (logical high) in  the 
7 
Monitor (causing an  inadvertent switch) has  been a s ses sed  at 
0 . 0 0 3 ~ / 1 0 0 0  hrs .  Since normally there  a r e  seven operating 
modules,  the total  failure ra te  for  this failure mode is 
7A = 0. O Z l % / l O O O  h r s  
21 
and 
R8 = e - 7 A t  = 0.9979 
R9 - From Table B-I,  the failure ra te  of external connections is  - 
0.  0001 %,/lo00 hrs.  
the total  failure ra te  for  this element is  
Since there  are forty external  connections, 
40X = 0.004%/1000 h r  
and 
9 
11 -40At e 0.9996 . 
Finally the total Beam Supply reliability i s  
R R *  R~ - R~ R ~ .  .=, 0.9918 
2. Heater Inver te rs  and Switching Circui ts  
The functions andoutputs provided by the Heater  Inver te rs  and 
Switching Circuits a r e  as follows: 
Functions 
e Provide AC power to modulator zncl cathode hea ter  driven 
inve r te  r s 
o Provide low DC voltage to system logic and control functions 
outputs 
e 80 V, 5 KC square wave power output 
e 
e 
0 
t 6  VDC logic and control power 
t12 VDC logic and control power 
-12 VDC logic and control power 
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The functional circuit  diagram of the Heater Inver te rs  and Switching 
Circuit  is given in  Fig.  5. The single operating plus one standby module 
(two total) a r e  shown with the main AC power output being selected by the 
relay.  The 
hea ter  inverter  i s  s tar ted by ground command and init iates the engine warm 
up cycle. The failure sensing and automatic switching circui t  provides a 
s t a r t  command to  the standby inverter  in  the event that the main inverte:. 
fails. 
The relay is operated any t ime the standby inver te r  is running. 
In addition to supplying AC power to the system, the hea ter  inver te rs  
a lso supply the low voltage DC power which is required by the logic ant . ' on -  
t r o l  system. 
a failure could occur at a pojyit in the low voltage DC sys tem which would not 
be detected. 
sensing circuit ,  this contingency is provided for  by including a ground command 
link to  the standby inverter .  
for  start ing this module. 
Since the failure sensing circuit  only examines the main inver te r ,  
Rather than provide a m o r e  sophisticated and complex failure 
This addition then provides a redundant means  
The failure modes associated with the Heater Inverter  and Switching 
Circui ts  subsystem as well a s  the effect  of these fai lures  a r e  given in  
Table 11. 
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Fig .  5 .  Heater inver te rs  and switching circui t  functional d iagram.  
f T r .  Heater  Inverter-s ana :Switching Circui ts  Fa i lure  Modes 
TYPE O F  FAILURE 
-I 
i 
I 
1 .  
1.  
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 .  
Inverter  module failure 
Relay failure 
a. Operates inadvertently 
in  addition inver te r  No 
does not operate 
and 
2 
b. Fails to operate and i n  addi- 
tion inver te r  No.  1 does not 
ope'rate 
Low voltage rectifiler. fa i ls  short  
o r  f i l ter  fails  short  to  ground 
Command start No. 1, auto 
start No. 2, and command s tar t  
No. 2 all fail 
Fail sense and auto switch fails  
and in addition inverter  No. 1 
and Command Star t  No. 2 both 
fail 
Inadvertent auto s t a r t  No.  2 and 
in addition inver te r  No.  2 fails 
- RESULT 
I 
1. Standby module inser ted  i 
2. Switch AC power 
a .  AC power output connected 
to  a non-operating inver te r  
b. AC power output connected 
to  a non-operating inverter  
3.  Loss  of low voltage 
4. Neither inver te r  operates  
5. Standby module not s tar ted 
af ter  inver te r  No. 1 fails 
6. No operating inver te r  
Again i t em 1 in Table 11 does not represent  a sys tem failure since a standby 
module would automatically be inserted.  
resul t  in an over -a l l  sys tem failure. 
I t ems  2 through 6 ,  however, do 
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The reliability block d iagram of the Heater Inver te rs  and Switching 
Circuit is given in  F ig .  6. 
reliability standpoint this subsystem consis ts  of standby, paral le l ,  and 
s e r i e s  elements. In this  case the standby redundant elements have un- 
equal failure r a t e s  so that the reliability of the redundant portion is given 
It can be seen f r o m  this  d iagram that f r o m  a 
by 
- A 1 t  - A 2 t  
2e - Ale 
R1 = 
l2 - A l  
where A l  and A 
reliability of a paral le l  sys tem is given by 
a r e  the failure ra tes  of the respective elements .  The 2 
R = 1 - (1 - R1) (1 - R2) . .  . ( 1  - Rn) 
where R1, R2, . . . R 
F r o m  the appropriate S t r e s s  Sheets the R i l s  of the blocks shown in 
F i g .  6 can be determined with the following resu l t s :  
a r e  the reliabil i t ies of the elements in  paral le l .  n 
I I 1  
R1 = R1 = R1 = 0.9846 
R2 = R i  = 0.9988 
R3 = 0.9984 
R4 = R4 = 0.9999 (t = 1 2 0 h r s )  
I 
Consider next the various groupings of the blocks a s  represented by the 
Rils: 
26 
I 
D .  
I 
1 
I 
D 
€ 75 7 -I7 1 ------- I-- - 
1 - 7  I r i  I 3 I I 
I 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
F i g .  6 ,  Heater  inverter  and switching circui ts  reliabil i ty diagram. 
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7 R5, R6 - Para l le l  group with reliability R 
where R7 = 1 - (1-R5) (l-Rg) 
I 
8 R7, R1, R2 - Ser ies  group with reliability R 
where R8 = R7 * R; R2 
I 
9 R5 - Series  group with reliability R R1’ 
I 
R9 = R1 * R5 where 
R9 - Para l le l  group with reliability R10 R8’ 
where R10 = 1 - (1-R8) (1-R9) 
11 R4 - Series  group with reliability R R1O’ 
where R l l  = R10 * R4 = 0.9996 
yielding an effective failure ra te  for 10, 000 h r s  for  these elements of 
X l t  = 0.00042 
R i ,  RY, R i  - Ser ies  group with reliability R12 
I I I  I 
where RIZ  = R4 * R1 * R2 = 0.9832 
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yielding an effective failure ra te  for  10, 000 h r s  for  these elements of 
h2t = 0.1684 
R12 - Standby redundant group with failure r a t e s  A and A 2 ,  r espec t -  R 1 l '  1 - ..-- 
i v e l j .  Using Eq. 4 the reliability R1 of the standby redundant group i s  
. R3, R 1  - Ser ies  group which provides the total  reliability R of the Heater  
Inver te rs  and Switching Circuit  subsystem where 
1 R = R . R3 = 0 . 9 9 8 4  
3. Feed Svstem and Neutralizer Modulators 
The function and outputs provided by the Feed  System and Neutral izer  
Modulators subsystem a r e  as follows: 
Functions 
0 Provide power to feed system and neutral izer  
outputs  
3 VAC neutral izer  power output 
t5 VDC voltage te lemetry 
t5 VDC curren t  te lemetry 
5 VAC vaporizer  power output (isolated fo 
t5 VDC voltage telemetry 
t5 VDC curren t  te lemetry 
5 VAC p r e s s u r i z e r  power output (isolated for t 3 .  5 KV) 
t5 VDC voltage te lemetry 
t5 VDC curren t  telemetry 
t10 VDC valve power output (isolated for  t3. 5 KV) 
+ 3. 5 KV) 
The functional circuit  d iagram of the Modulator subsystem is shown in 
F i g .  7. 
and i s  all contained in a single module. 
Heater  Inverter and modulated by the var ious regulators as shown. 
sys tem outputs a r e  isolated for  high voltage in this design. 
This subsystem pe r fo rms  severa l  functions but i s  physically smel l  
AC power i s  received f rom the 
The feed 
Since there  i s  no redundancy employed, the failure modes associatC~3 
with C-;e Modulators subsystem a r e  simply the failure of any component. 
The reliability block d iagram of this subsystem would therefore  consist of 
a single se r i e s  e lement .  
The reliability of the Feed System and Neutral izer  Modulators i s  
given by 
R -At = e  (5) 
where A i s  given in the Modulator S t ress  Sheet as  0. 3538%/1000 hrs.  
fore ,  
The re -  
R -0. 03538 e 0 . 9 6 5 2  
4. 
as f c  
Cathode Heater Supply 
The function and outputs provided by the Cathode Heater  subsystem a re  
lows: 
Functions 
0 Provide AC power to  the cathode hea ter  
outputs 
0 3 VAC square wave power output (isolated for t3. 5KV) 
t5 VDC voltage te lemet ry  
t 5  VDC current  te lemet ry  
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F i g .  7 . Modulator subsystem functional d i ag ram.  
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The functional c i rcui t  diagram of the Cathode Heater  supply i s  p r e -  
The single operating and one standby module (two total) sented in  Fig. 8. 
a r e  shown with the output relay switch which supplies pr ime DC power to 
the operating module and also connects the AC output f rom the operating 
m o d d e  to  the output t r a n s f o r m e r .  
operates the output re lay switch in the event of a failure of the main invert(:  - .  
The inverter  modules used h e r e  a r e  driven inve r t e r s  with the AC drive 
being received from the Heater Inver te rs .  
The fa i l  sense and switching circui t  
The output t ransformer ,  the te lemetry c i rcu i t s ,  and the regulator c i r -  
cuit a r e  contained in a separate  module called the Cathode Controller.  (In 
actual pract ice ,  the output t ransformer  was mounted at the engine to mini-  
mize t ransmission line drop. ) 
curren t ,  compares this to  the desired value (commanded by the analog 
control system), and provides an e r r o r  signal to the pulse-width modulator 
in  the inver te r .  Redundancy i s  not provided for  the c i rcu i t ry  in the Cathode 
Controller module. 
The regulator measu res  the output RMS 
The failure modes associated with the Cathode Heater  subsystem a s  
well a s  the effect of these fai lures  a r e  given in  Table 111. 
3 2  
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F i g .  8 .  Cathode heater supply functional d iagram 
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TABLE I11 
Cathode Heater  Failure Modes 
TYPE O F  FAILURE 
I 1 1. Inverter module fai lure  
2. Input t ransformer  fai ls  short  o r  
short  to ground 
Relay o r  driving circui t  failure 
a .  Operates inadvertently and in  
3. 
addition inverter  No. 2 mal- 
functions 
Fai ls  to operate and in addi- 
tion inver te r  No. 1 malfunctions 
b.  
I 4. Regulator o r  t r ans fo rmer  failure 
~ 
RESULT 
1. Standby module inser ted  
2. Overloads AC driven source  
(heater inver te r )  
3. Switch A C  power 
a .  AC power out connected 
to  non- ope rating inver te r  
b .  AC power out connected to 
a non--operating inver te r  
4. Loss of output 
-- 
I t em 1 i n  Table I11 does not represent  a sys tem fai lure  since the standy mod- 
ule i s  automatically inser ted.  I t ems  2, 3, and 4 do, however, resu l t  in a 
l o s s  of the system. 
The reliability block diagram of the Cathode Heater  is given in F ig .  9 .  
This sybsystem consis ts  of standby and s e r i e s  e lements .  
cally only one failure sense and switch is imployed, f rom a reliability point 
of view two possible fa i lure  modes exis t  for  this element:  
switching ( A a )  and (2)  complete fa i lure  ( A  ) .  
assume h 
Although physi-  
(1) inzdvertent 
F o r  the sake of conserva t i sm b 
is equal to Ab. a 
F r o m  the appropriate S t r e s s  Sheets,  the Ri 's  of the blocks shown in 
Fig.  9 can  be determined as  follows 
R1 = 0 . 9 8 8 0  
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Fig .  9 .  Cathode heater supply reliabil i ty d iagram.  
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R1 = 0.9880 
R2 = 0.9978 
R 3  = 0.9996 
R4 = 0.9875 
Consider now the various groupings of blocks a s  represented by the R. ' s :  
1 
5 R2 - Two series groups each with reliability R R1' 
where R5 = R1 - R2 - 0.9858 
R5, R5 - Standby redundant group with equal fa i lure  r a t e s  so that 
R1 = R5 (1 - A t )  = 0 .  Cj'j;;'Cj 
R4 - Ser ies  group which provides the total  reliability of the R , R3, 
Cathode Heater subsystem 
1 
1 R = R * R3 * R4 = 0.9870 . 
5. Logic and Control 
The functions and outputs provided by the Logic and Control sub- 
sys tem a r e  as follows: 
Function s 
High power control logic 
0 Provides  tu rn  on/off and redundant switching commands 
to  Beam, Accel/Magnet, and Arc Supplies 
Provides  for  Beam voltage reduction at high line 
voltages 
e 
System timing and control 
0 Provides  timing fo r  start pulses ,  t r i p  sampling, and 
vaporizer  delay 
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Provides  interface for  sys tem turn  on/off 
Provides  t r i p  level sensing and generation of overload 
turn  off commands 
Analog control system 
0 Derives  des i red  control charac te r i s t ics  f r o m  system 
pa rame te r  inputs 
Provides  l inear  control signals to variable supplies 
based on derived control charac te r i s t ics  
0 
outputs 
e Low level logic commands 
t e Low level analog control signals. ; 
The functional c i rcui t  diagram of the Logic and Control subsystem i s  
shown in  Fig.  10. 
sections of analog c i rcu i t ry  and digital c i rcui t ry .  
further divided into a timing and control section and a control logic section. 
The functions of these individual sections a r e  summarized in Fig.  10. 
Although a large number of operations a r e  being performed by this sys tem,  
it is  physically sma l l  and i s  all contained in  a single module. 
portion of the circui t ry  (both the analog and digital sections) i s  mechanized 
with integrated microcircuits 
and high reliability. 
This subsystem may  be logically divided into two bas ic  
The digital portion m a y  be 
The ma jo r  
in o r d e r  to  achieve small s ize  and weight 
There is no redundancy employed in this subsystem and a s  such the 
mathematical  model reduces to  a s e r i e s  element and the reliability calcula- 
t ion i s  based on component failure ra te  tabulation. F o r  convenience of ca l -  
culation the Logic and Control i s  divided into th ree  s e r i e s  blocks, namely; 
( 1 )  sys tem timing and control function, R1; (2) high power control logic, 
R2; and (3) analog control system, R3. 
B, the numerical  values 
F r o m  the S t r e s s  Sheets in Appendix 
of the Ri 's  a r e  as follows: 
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R1 = 0.9748 
R = 0.9807 
2 
R 3  = 0 . 9 7 1 8  . 
The total  Logic and Control subsystem reliability is  then 
R = R * R 2 * R 3  = 0.9292 . 1 
6. Arc Supply 
The function and outputs of the Arc Supply subsystem a r e  a s  follows: 
Function 
0 Provide DC power to  the a r c  discharge 
outputs 
0 
0 
t36 VDC discharge power output (isolated for  t 3 .  5 KV) 
t108 VDC boost at Iarc I 10 mA 
t 5  VDC voltage telemetry 
t5 VDC current  telemetry . 
The functional c i rcui t  diagram of the Arc supply i s  shown in Fig.  11. 
The two operating plus one standby modules ( three total) a r e  shown with 
the i r  outputs AC added in a ser ies  s t r ing.  
turned off o r  has failed must  reflect a short  c i rcui t  since diode shunting 
cannot be used. 
p r imary  with a relay a s  shown in  the diagram. 
employ driven inver te rs  with the AC drive being received from the Accel/ 
Magnet inver te rs  ( see  next section). 
is supplied to  the rect i f ier ,  f i l ter ,  and regulator c i rcui t ry  which i s  located 
In this  case ,  a module which i s  
The short  is reflected by shorting the output t ransformer  
The modules used he re  
The AC power out of the se r i e s  string 
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in a fourth module called the Arc Rectifier F i l t e r .  
the output DC voltage, compares this to the des i red  value (commanded by 
the analog control system),  and provides an e r r o r  signal to  the pulse-width 
modulators in  the inve r t e r s .  Redundancy is not provided for  the c i rcu i t ry  
in  the Arc  Rectifier F i l t e r  module. 
The regulator m e a s u r e s  
The failure modes associated with the Arc  Supply subsystem a r e  sum-  
Some explanation mar i zed  in Table IV along with their  effect on the sys tem.  
is necessa ry  for  Item 3.  
the possibility that the relay (this includes driving circui t ry)  would fail  to 
shor t  the p r imary  in  the event of a module fai lure .  It will be noticed that 
no mention is made of the possibility of the relay i n  the standby module 
failing in such a way that it opens the p r imary  and energizes  the module. 
If this  should occur ,  then all three modules would be simultaneously ope :at- 
ing. However, since this is  a regulated supply, and the three  operating 
inve r t e r s  would be cut back such that they produced the normal  output. 
this  re lay  fai lure  mode does not represent  a sys tem failure and although it 
changes the configuration slightly, this change has  negligible effect on the 
reliabil i ty calculation. 
It can  be seen that the fai lure  mode l is ted covers  
Thus,  
Hence, this mode i s  not l isted on the drawing. 
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TABLE IV 
Arc Supply Fa i lure  Modes 
I 
TYPE OF FAILURE 
1. 
2. 
I 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
6 .  
7. 
~ 
RESULT 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
6 .  
7. 
Inverter Module Fa i lure  
Fai lure  monitor failure 
a. Indicates no failure when 
b. Indicates failure when one 
one has  occurred 
has not occur red  
Relay fails i n  such a way that it 
does not short  the module p r imary  
when a fa i lure  has  occurred in  
that module 
Input t ransformer  fails  short  to 
ground 
Output t ransformer  fails  short  to  
ground o r  open secondary (may 
be reflected) 
Rectifier -fi l ter  o r  Regulator 
failure 
Ser ies  s t r ing connections mechani- 
ca l  open o r  short  to ground 
Standby Module Inser ted  
a. Standby not inser ted  the re -  
b. Standby inser ted  and indica.  
fore output too low 
ted failed module kemoved 
Series  s t r ing open 
AC Drive overloaded 
Short placed on 3.  5 KV bus o r  
s e r i e s  s t r ing opens 
Loss  of output 
Short placed on 3 . 5  KV bus 
o r  s e r i e s  s t r ing opens 
As indicated I tems 1 and 2b in  Table IV do not resu l t  in a sys tem fai lure .  
I tems  2a and 3 through 7 do, however, affect a loss  of the system. 
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The reliabil i ty block diagram of the Arc  Supply (see Fig.  12) shows 
that this subsystem consis ts  of standby and s e r i e s  e lements .  
of the standby redundant portion which cons is t s  of the blocks designated by 
R1 through R can be determined by 
The reliability 
4 
R1 (1 -t mXt) -mXt e 
r ,  fail ens F r o m  the S t r e s s  Sheets the failure rates of the a r c  invert  , 
2nd switching (these latter two being the monitor and relay)  a r e  0. 1308%/ 
1000 h r s ,  0. 0123%/1000 h r s ,  and 0.0063%/1000 h r s ,  respectively.  Thus,  
since these th ree  elements a r e  in s e r i e s ,  the fai lure  ra te  in Eq. 6 is  given 
as 
X = 0. 1308%/1000 h r s  + 0 . 0 1 2 3 ~ / 1 0 0 0  hrs  + 0.00635/1000 h r s  
= 0. 1495%/1000 h r s  
mAt = 2 x 0. 1495%/1000 hrs  x 10,000 hrs = 0.0299 
and 
R1 = 0.9991 . 
1 Since R i s  in  s e r i e s  with R 
Arc  Supply is given by 
R6, R7, and R8, the total  reliabil i ty of the 5’ 
R = R1 * R5 - R 6 .  R7 R8 = 0.9813 . 
F r o m  the appropriate S t ress  Sheets i n  Table B-I the remaining R . ’ s  1 
of the blocks shown in Fig.  12 can be determined with the following resu l t s  
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= 0. 9994 ( 3  t ransformers ,  1 fa i lure  mode) 
R5 
R6 = 0. 9982 ( 3  t ransformers ,  2 fa i lure  modes)  
R7 = 0.9837 
R8 = 0.9998 (10  connections) 
7. Ac ce le r ato r/Magne t Supply 
The functions and outputs provided by the Accelerator/Magnet Supply 
subsystem are as follows: 
Functions 
Provide DC power to  the magnet 
Provide DC power to  accelerator  at -2000 VDC 
Provide AC drive to a rc  inve r t e r s  
0 
0 
OUtDUt s 
0 t 4  VDC magnet power output 
t 5  VDC curren t  telemetry No. 1 
i-5 VDC curren t  telemetry No. 2 
-2000 VDC accelerator  power output 
t 5  VDC voltage telemetry 
t 5  VDC curren t  te lemetry 
20 VAC push-pull drive for  arc supply 
0 
0 
The functional c i rcui t  diagram of the Accelerator/Magnet supply i s  
shown in  Fig.  13. 
employed (total of two). 
supplies the Magnet rect i f iers .  
Accelerator  high voltage t r ans fo rmers  whose outputs a r e  DC added in a 
One operating inver te r  plus one standby inve r t e r  a r e  
The major portion of the inver te r  output power 
A sma l l e r  amount of power supplies the 
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F i g .  13 .  Accelerator-magnet  supply functional diagram..  
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manner  similar to that of the Beam Supply. In  addition, AC drive i s  supplied 
to the Arc  inve r t e r s .  The Magnet rec t i f ie rs  and the Accelerator  high voltage 
t r ans fo rmers  and associated circui ts  are located i n  a third module called the 
Accel/Magnet Rectifier.  
The failure modes associated with the Accelerator/Magnet subsystem 
as well  as their effect on the system a r e  given in  Table V.  
TABLE V 
Ac c e le  r ato r /M agne t Supply Fa i lure  Mode s 
TYPE OF FAILURE 
1. Inver te r  module fai lure  
2., Failure monitor fa i lure  
a. Indicates no fai lure  when 
one has occurred  
has not occur red  
b. Indicates fa i lure  when one 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 .  
Magnet rec t i f ie rs  fail  short  
Magnet t r ans fo rmers  or  Accel 
t r ans fo rmers  fail  short  t o  
ground 
Component failure of any type 
i n  Accel filter 
External  connections mechani - 
cal open o r  short  t o  ground 
RESULT 
1. Standby module inser ted  
2. 
a. Standby not inser ted  - 
b. Standby inser ted and indica- 
output too low 
ted failed mad&--removed 
3 .  Overload inve r t e r s  
4. Short on t 3 . 5  KV bus o r  
shor t  on - 2 KV bus 
5. Accel shor t  to ground, l o s s  
of te lemetry,  poor ripple 
6 .  Loss of Magnet o r  Accel 
output 
All items in  Table V ,  except 1 and 2b, resul t  i n  a sys tem fai lure .  
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The relizbility dis-gram of the Accelerator/Magnet is  given in  F ig .  14. 
It can be  seen f rom this Ciagram, thzt Accelerator/Magnet subsystem con- 
s i s t s  of standby and s e r i e s  elements.  
With the exception of R 3  (i. e .  , the reliability of the Fa i lure  Monitor 
function) the R . ' s  can be obtained f r o m  the appropriate S t r e s s  Sheets i n  
Appendix B; 
fa i lures  in the inver te rs  ( i .  e .  R1). 
rect i f ier  element without a simultaneous (or  subsequent) failure in the 
inver te r ,  the standby system would not be switched in .  
the fei lure  monitor,  
of such an occurrence to provide the actual reliabil i ty of the failure monitor 
function, R3. 
fa i lure  i n  a rect i f ier  i s  given by 
1 
The failure monitor in  this subsystem is l imited to detecting 
Thus, should a fa i lure  occur i n  a 
The reliabil i ty of 
inust ,  therefore ,  he degraded by the probability RFM J 
The probability of a fa i lure ,  PFJ i n  an inver te r  without a 
PF = 1 - Ps 
where I? the probability of both failing is  S' 
Ps = ( l - R Z )  R1 . 
Therefore ,  the reliability of the fai lure  sensing function is  
R3 - RFM[l-  ( i -R2)R1]  . 
The values of the R. ' s  a r e  then 
1 
I 
R1 = R ,  = 0.9814 
I 
RZ = R 2  .= ,019917 
= 0.9970 R~~ 
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- [ 1- (1-R1)R2] = 0.9919 
= 0.9958 
R 3  - R~~ 
R4 
R5 = 0.9986 
= 0.9987 
= 0.9999 . 
R6 
R7 
The various groupings of the blocks as designated by the Rils  a r e :  
8 R1, R2 - Series  group with reliability R 
where R8 = R1 * R2 = 0.9732 
yielding an effective failure ra te  for  10, 000 h rs  for these elements  of 
X l t  = 0.00265 
I I 
R1, R2, R3 - Ser ies  group with reliability Rq 
I 1 
where R9 = R1 - R2 * R3 = 0.9653 
yielding an effective failure ra te  for  10, 000 hrs  for  these elements  of 
t = 0. 0346 2 
R8, R9 
tively. Using Eq. 4 the reliability, R , of the standby redundant group i s  
- Standby redundant group with failure r a t e s  h l  and Xz, r e spec -  
1 -- 
R1 = '2 R8 - '1 R9 = 0.9993 . 
h ,  - A ,  
L 1 
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’ Since the remainder  of the blocks are i n  s e r i e s  with R1, the total  
reliability of the Accelerator/Magnet is given by 
R7 = 0.9926 . 1 R = R * R 4 * R 5 .  R6 
I 
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C .  LAUNCH CONSIDERATIONS 
The analysis to  this  point has been based on the long 10, 000 hour 
benign environment to  be encountered while in space .  However, sys tem 
reliability i s  degraded by the necessi ty  to survive the r a the r  s eve re  
environment of the launch phase.  
cally by multiplying the basic  component fa i lure  r a t e s  by an appropriate 
fac tor .  These fac tors  a r e  listed in Table VI .  
The launch phase is  t reated mathemati-  
Rather than multiply each individual component by i t s  par t icu lar  
factor ,  the conservative approach of multiplying each component fa i lure  
r a t e  b y  the highest factor (100) was taken. 
find an equivalent failure ra te  for the ent i re  sys tem,  multiply this by 
100 and then evaluate the reliability degradation for  the launch duration 
(assumed to be 0 . 2  houj.). 
It is then only necessa ry  to 
4 -Xeq . 10 h r s =  0 . 8 5  e 
Xeq = 1.6%/1000 h r s  
* 100 * ( 0 . 2  h r s )  - heq = 0 . 9 9 9 7  e 
The total sys tem reliability ( 0 . 8 5 )  mus t  be multiplied by t h i s  
number to include the launch phase.  
l a rge  difference in  t ime periods,  the launch degradation has  l i t t le effect 
on over-al l  reliabil i ty.  
It can be seen that because of the 
5 2  
TABLE VI 
Application K-Factors  (MIL-HDBK- 2 17k)  
Part Type 
Diode-Power 
Diode -Silicon 
Diode-Zener 
Trans is tor -  Power 
Trans is tor -  Silicon 
+ ,  
Capacitors-Tantalum , 
Capacitors - Foil  
Electrolytic 
Capacitors -Aluminum 
Electrolytic 
Capacitors - C e r amic  
Temp.  Comp. 
Resis tors-Fixed Film 
Re si s t o r s - Ac cu rat e 
W i r e  Wound 
Res is tors  - Power 
Wire Wound 
Re si s to r  s - Fixed 
Composition 
Specification 
MIL-S- 19500 
MIL-S- 19500 
MIL-S-19500 
MIL-S- 19500 
MIL-S- 19500 
MIL-C -3  965 
MIL-C -3 965 
MIL-C-62 
MIL-C-20 
MIL-R- 10509 
MIL-R-93 
MIL-R-26 
MIL-R- 11 
~- 
Application 
Missi le  
Missi le  
Missi le  
Missi le  
Missi le  
Missi le  
Mis  si le 
Missi le  
Missi le  
Missi le  
Missi le  
Miss i le  
Miss i le  
K-Factor  
18 
10 
10 
75 
25 
25 
40 
2 .0  
15 
1 . 5  
13 .0  
100 
50 
.Id 1\ 
Note: : Tantalum wet slug tempera ture  range 0 - 125OC 
Tantalum glass  seal  wet slug tempera ture  range : 
0 - 175OC 
References:  Hughes Reliability Knowledge on Surveyor Space- 
c raf t .  
Hughes Designers Reliability Handbook No. R-67 -2, 
page 8 and MIL-STD-756. 
Parts Selection-Control on Satell i tes "How the 
Experts  Pick Reliable Components" (Copy in  
Appendix). 
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SECTION IV 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS/IMPROVED SYSTEM 
Based on the reliability analysis on the thermal/vacuum proto- 
type a s  well as m o r e  closely matching the power capability of the 
supplies to the 15 c m  thrus te r  requirements,  a modified power con- 
ditioning and control sys tem h a s  been designed. 
the reliabil i ty of this improved system has been thus increased with 
no associated weight penalty. 
As will be shown 
The numerical  resu l t s  that were  obtained for  the improved 
sys tem were generated by using the thermal/vacuum prototype sys tem 
numbers  and modifying these to  account for  any circui t  changes.  
resu l t s  of this  analysis a r e  summarized in  F i g .  15.  
that  the total  sys tem reliabil i ty has been increased to 0 . 9 6 .  
tion of the changes along with a summary of the calculations a r e  p r e -  
sented in the following paragraphs.  
The 
It may be seen 
A descr ip-  
A .  BEAM SUPPLY 
The power demand of a 15 c m  th rus t e r  is such that the Beam 
Supply can be reduced f r o m  the original 7 operating modules with 2 
in standby to  4 operating modules with 2 in  standby. 
wi l l  not have an appreciable affect on the reliability of the system, it 
does provide a substantial reduction in the s ize  and weight of the Beam 
While this change 
Supply * 
Referr ing to Section 111. B .  1 ,  the R. I s of the improved Beam 
1 
Supply a r e  changed a s  follows 
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R1 = e  -4Xt = 0 . 9 3 7  1 (4 operating modules) 
R2 = e -4Xt ( 4 X  t )  = 0.0609 (4 operating modules) 
-4Xt -- (4Xt)L - 0.0020 (4 operating modules) 
2 R = e  3 
R4 = R 
R = 0.9974: (no change) 
R, = 0.9982 (6 t ransformers)  
R8 = 0.9988 (4 operating modules) 
R9 = 0.9975 (26 external connections). 
= 0.9980 (no change) 5 
6 
The total Beam Supply reliability is R = (R t R R 
- R8 * Rq = 0.9940. 
t R R ) - R6 * R7 1 2 4  3 5  
B .  HEATER INVERTERS AND SWITCHING CIRCUIT 
No change was made in this subsystem. 
C .  FEED SYSTEM AND NEUTRALIZER MODULATORS 
The existing Modulator subsystem provides regulated power 
isolated a t  high voltage to  the Vaporizer and P r e s s u r i z e r .  
provides on/off high voltage isolated power to the Valve and regulated 
power to the Neutral izer .  The current design employs magnetic ampli- 
fiers and t r ans fo rmers  and i s  relatively heavy and bulky considering the 
power level  involved. The successful demonstration of i so la tors  for  the 
engine feed sys tems now allows considerable reduction of the hardware 
involved in this subsystem. 
It a l so  
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IC i s  now qossible to design a t r a n s f o r m e r l e s s  feed sys tem supply 
wliich crriploys c'. single t r ans i s to r  switch between the solar  a r r a y  and 
2. b-;e L !oad. 
imrenieter to !,e controlled against an analog command level  (gener- 
ated b y  the control s y s t e m ) .  
is deterrnined bythe output parameter  sensing t ime constant and may  
ezsily be adjusted over a wide range.  
using all seiniconductors and microc i rcu i t s  and thus provides a s ize  
and weight advantage over the magnetic sys t em.  It a l so  has a lower 
par t  count and this simplicity resu l t s  in higher reliabil i ty.  
of a typical c i rcui t  of this  type i s  shown i n  F ig .  16.  
T;,is switch i s  operated by threshold detectiag the output 
The frequency of operation of the switch 
This design may  be mechanized 
A diagram 
TLe reduction in s ize  and weight of these modulator c i rcui ts  
not only improves the basic  module reliabil i ty,  it a l so  allows the addi- 
tion of a complete redundant sys tem.  That is ,  it is  now possible to 
design a Modulator subsystem which incorporates  100% redundancy 
and yet is smaller  in s ize  and lighter in weight than the or iginal .  
F o r  the purpose of analysis,  it w a s  assumed that re lay switch- 
ing (one shot operation) would be used to accommodate the redundant 
sys t em.  
method, i t s  assumption does provide a means  for  assess ing  the 
reliability gain through redundancy. 
ing schemes only affect the calculation in the th i rd  o r  fourth decimal  
place anCL thus the re lay  scheme adequately weights the effect of the 
switching circui t .  
Although relay switching i s  not necessa r i ly  the optimum 
Small  differences in the switch- 
In order  to  numerically evaluate the effect of this c i rcui t  change 
on subsystem reliability, a new reliabil i ty block d iagram is necessa ry .  
The 100% redundant sys tem is represented by the simple diagram shown 
in F i g .  17 .  
i)y assuming a complete design based on the typical c i rcui t  shown in 
F ig .  16 and tabulating component failure r a t e s  on that b a s i s .  
fa i lure  ra te  was found to  be 0 .11  94%/1000 h r s .  
The fai lure  ra te  for  the new modulator c i rcui t  was evaluated 
The total  
58 
.I 
1 -  
I 
I 
I 
E 757 -15 
F i g .  1 6 .  Trans is tor  switch modulator.  
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€751-10 n n 
F i g .  17 . Improved modulator reliability, functional. 
6 0  
It was also determined that s ix  l ines would need to  be switched 
to change over to the standby. 
t h ree  double pole re lays  (failure ra te  for  each equals 0.003%0/1000 h r s )  
and hence the fai lure  rates of these relays m u s t  be included as 
s e r i e s  e lements .  
group i s  
Th i s  switching was to  be done with 
Thus, the total fa i lure  r a t e  of the R1, R2 series 
The total reliability of the standby redundant Modulator sub- 
A = 0,1194 t (3  - 0.003) = 0.1284%/1000 h r s .  
sys tem is then given by R' = (1 t A t )  = 0 . 9 9 9 9 .  
D .  CATHODE HEATER SUPPLY 
The improvement to  the Cathode Heater consis ts  of providing 
redundant c i rcui ts  for  the regulator and te lemet ry  functions. This 
redundancy involves only a small  number of semiconductor compo- 
nents and thus the change has little effect on s ize  and weight. 
effect  of redundancy i s  again evaluated by assuming relay switching. 
Note that i f  r e lay  switching were actually employed, smal l  TO-5 
s ize ,  double pole, re lays  a r e  available and a r e  fully qualified. Thus,  
the s ize  and weight considerations were  not overlooked when con- 
sidering this  fo rm of switching. 
The 
The improvement affects the R block (regulator and t r ans -  
f o r m e r )  of F i g .  9 with the remainder of the original Cathode Heater  
diagram being unchanged. 
reliabil i ty diagram that should be used to  replace R4 in F i g .  9 .  
may be seen that the original block has been split into two p a r t s .  
par t  remains a s  nonredundant and the other p a r t  fo rms  one half of a 
redundant p a i r .  
and thus 5 re lays  a r e  requi red .  
The reliabil i ty of the redundant portion of F ig .  18 is  again 
R r e-At (1 t A t )  where A i s  the sum of the fai lure  r a t e s  of the 
regulator and te lemet ry  and 5 relay switches.  F r o m  the fai lure  
r a t e s  previously given A = 0.1135%0/1000 h r s  and RI = 0.9999. The 
5 
The diagram given in  F ig .  18 shows the 
It 
One 
It has been determined that 10 l ines  would be switched 
1 
reliabil i ty of the modified R block is  then R = RI - R = 0.9971 
where R5 = e * .  
4 4 5 -Alt 
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E .  LOGIC AND CONTROL 
The existing Logic and Control module does not employ redun- 
dancy. 
module, it is possible to add a completely redundant c i rcui t  and still 
keep the package within the confines of a single module. 
and Control sys tem is mechanized with integrated microc i rcu i t s  and 
thus ve ry  dense packaging i s  possible. 
Because of the small size of the components used in this 
The Logic 
This type of c i rcui t ry  lends itself to many possible techniques 
How- whereby redundancy m a y  be  built d i rect ly  in the configuration. 
ever ,  again to expedite the analysis, the affect of redundancy is evalu- 
ated by assuming re lay  switching between the operating and standby 
l ines .  A block d iagram is shown i n  F i g .  19. It is necessary  to 
switch 30 l ines he re  and thus 15 relays a r e  shown. 
The total fa i lure  ra te  of the s e r i e s  elements in the redundant 
group shown in F ig .  19 is 0.7804%/1000 h r s  and the total  reliability 
of this  subsystem is given by R' = e-Xt (1 t At) = 0.9971. 
F .  ARC SUPPLY 
The improvement to  the Arc  Supply consis ts  of providing 
redundant c i rcui ts  for  the regulator and te lemet ry  functions in a 
manner  similar to  that of the Cathode Heater  improvement.  
improvement affects the R block (Rectify, F i l te r  and Regulate) of 
F i g .  12  with the remainder  of the original Arc Supply d iagram being 
unchanged. Figure 20 shows the reliabil i ty diagram which replaces  
R7 i n F i g .  12.  
Again the reliability of the redundant portion of F ig .  20 can 
be found by the expression R = e-Xt (1 t A t )  where X i s  the sum 
of the fai lure  r a t e s  of the regulator and te lemet ry  and the 5 re lay  
switches.  
The 
7 
1 
F r o m  failure r a t e s  previously given 
X = 0.1047%/1000 h r s  
and 
R 1 = 0.9958 . 6 3  
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F i g .  1 9 .  Improved logic and control reliability functional. 
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F i g .  20. Modification to R7 block of arc supply. 
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1 1 The  reliability of the modified 
where R 
R7 block is then R7 = R * R9 = 0.9885 
-X3t 
9 = e  
Thus, the total  reliability of the improved Arc  Supply is 
1 1 
R = R - R5- R6*  R: - R = 0.9850 where R , R5, R6, and R a r e  
obtained from Section 111. B . 6 .  
8 8 
G .  ACCELERATOR/MAGNET SUPPLY 
An improvement was made to the Accel/Magnet supply which was 
of r a the r  low o r d e r  f rom a reliability standpoint. 
noticeable change in  the numerical  resul t  when this  change is incorporated.  
However, the change involves essentially no hardware and as  such, it 
is a recommended addition. 
In fact ,  there  is  no 
The Accel/Magnet supply employs a fai lure  monitor c i rcui t  
which senses  whether or  not the inverter  is functioning proper ly .  
ever ,  there  are some components "downstream" f r o m  the inverter  which 
could fai l  and yet, not be detected.  
and the inverter  should continue to function properly,  the standby sys tem 
would not be turned on. 
this  occurring very  smal l .  
ing the standby sys t em (in this  case ,  built in logic turns  off the main 
inver te r )  f rom a ground command, this  mode of fa i lure  can be circumvented. 
Since the interface for  accommodating a general  command exis t s ,  this  
change is easily accomplished. 
How- 
If this type of fa i lure  should occur 
The numbers  involved make the probability of 
However, by including the possibility of s t a r t -  
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A P P E N D I X  A 
DERIVATION OF EXACT 
MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
Rigorous derivations of exact mathematical  models for the Beam 
Supply and Cathode Heater subsystems a r e  presented h e r e .  Also 
included in this Appendix a r e  the exact mathematical  expressions for 
the remaining subsystem discussed in this report .  
mat ical  models were  derived by considering the sequential failure events 
possible for  those p a r t s  of the system utilizing standby redundant elements.  
(The remaining pa r t s  a r e  simple s e r i e s  elements in a reliability sense.  ) 
These derivations include the effects of the failure sensing and switching 
mechanisms on the reliability of redundant configurations. Attention is 
directed to the possibility of inadvertent switching occurring as well a s  
that of the failure sensing and switching circui ts  being nonoperable at a 
t ime when they are needed. 
These exact mathe-  
The derivation of the mathematical model for the Beam Supply was 
chosen for detailed discussion since it is  a key par t  of the system and is  
a representative complex case .  
configuration was also chosen f o r  detailed discussion. 
simple form of standby redundancy in which one inver te r  stands by while 
the first inverter  operates .  This basic  configuration is  used repeatedly 
in  both the present  design and i n  the improved system design. 
The derivation for  the Cathode I leater  
it is typical. of the 
BEAM S U P P L Y  
The Beam Supply consists of the modules shown in  the functional 
diagram, Fig.  3 of this report .  F igure  4 shows the reliability block dia- 
g ram.  In deriving the mathematical model, Fig.  A - l  i s  helpful in  under- 
standing the possible sequences leading to  a system failure.  The diagram 
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deals only with the Beam Supply inverter  modules. The remainder  of the 
components of the Beam Supply a re  in  s e r i e s  f rom a reliability viewpoint 
and the i r  effect  is included af ter  consideration of the 9 inver te r  modules 
and the i r  failure sensors .  
The Beam Supply can be thought of a s  operating successfully in any 
one of three states  as  shown in  the rectangular boxes of F i g .  A-1. 
at the top of the figure, the modules will  operate in State 1 for  the en t i re  
mission,  providing neither one of the original modules fails  nor inadvertent 
failure sensing and switching occurs for  one of the original seven. 
is ;L cer tain probability of occurrence for  each of these failure modes.  
subject diagram can be followed through step by step with the branching at  
each point showing the possible consequences of the subject occurrence.  
A probability can be assigned to each branching a r m  at points where a l t e r -  
native s exi s t .  
Starting 
There 
The 
The probability of successful operation ( i .  e .  , reliability) of the beam 
supply at  any t ime t i s  simply the probability of operating in e i ther  State 1, 
2, o r  3 at that t ime.  
R'(t) = Pl(t) t P2(t) t P,(t) (A-1) 
where 
P (t)  = probability of success  in state n at  t ime t 
ri'(t) = reliability of system. 
n 
T c  :;olve the above equation for  system reliabil i ty,  the solution for 
each t e r m  will be developed. Therefore,  le t :  
h l :  fa i lure  ra te  for 7 operating modules 
XI : failure ra te  for  single module standing by, and 
: failure ra te  f o r  failure monitor,  
X Y  
then, 
- X 1 t  
P l ( t )  = e (A-2) 
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' I  
The t e r m  P2(t) is determined by examining Fig.  A-1 to cieterrnine. 
the various ways of arriving in  State 2 a t  a t ime t t h ,  where h i s  a sma l l  
time interval. 
One way of arr iving in State 2 at  t ime t t h would be to s t z r t  i n  State 1 
at t ime t ,  experience a module failure during the t ime in te rva l  t to  t + 11, 
successfully detect the failed module and switch one of the standby modules 
into operation. 
be i n  State 2 at  t ime t and experience no fai lure  which would cause a depar -  
t u re  f r o m  State 2 .  
beirig i-: State 2 at t ime t t h. 
A second way to a r r ive  i n  State 2 at  t ime t t h would be to 
Assigning probabili t ies to these two possible ways of 
P,(t t h )  = Pl(t) 
- x  t - xtt] 
(A-3) 
since P2(t t h) is the sum of the two probabili t ies.  
ponds to  entering State 2 f rom State 1 along the single possible successful  
path. 
7 operating modules during the short  time interval  h. The quantity e 
is the probability that the failure sensor  for  the failed module is  still 
operable at t ime t,  and the quantity e 
by module switched in is still operable a t  t ime t. 
The first t e r m  c o r r e s -  
The quantity A h i s  the probability of failure of a single one of the 
1 - A y t  
- A ' t is  the probability that the stand- 
In the second t e r m  of eq.  A-3,  1 - h l h  is  the probability that no 
failure occurs  in the seven operating modules during the t ime interval  t t o  
t t h .  
Subtracting P2(t) f rom both s ides  of eq.  A - 3  and dividing both s ides  
by il yields 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
7 0  
Note that the previously determined expression for  P1 was inser ted.  
If h is allowed to become increasingly small ,  eq.  A-4 becomes 
But this is a simple first order  l inear differential equation. 
above equation with the boundary condition that Pz(0) = 0, yields 
Solving the 
(A-6) 
Similarly,  
- 2 1  t 
P3(t t h) = Pl(t) 
(A-7) 
The first t e r m  in  eq. A-7 is the probability of ending in  State 3 
a t  t ime t t h af ter  being in State 1 at t ime t .  In o rde r  for  this to happen, 
one of the original 7 modules must have failed, (Alh) ,  the failure sensor  
for  that  module must  have operated, (e 
must  have already failed, (1 - 
standby mdoule must  have operated, (e - Xyt), and finally, the second 
standby module must  not have failed, (e ) .  The second and third 
t e r m s  a r e  a r r ived  at s imilar ly  through the use  of Fig.  A-1 and the a s so -  
ciated probabili t ies.  
the first standby module 
the failure sensor  for  the failed 
- X ’ t  
Putting eq. A-7 into the form of a differntial equation, and solving 
the equation with the boundary value P3(0) = 0 yields 
71 
1 - e  X '  i- 2x P3(t) = A l e  
Y 
(A-8 )  
+ "y"]. 
Substituting the above equations for  P ( t ) ,  P2(t), and P (t) into equa- 1 3 
[..on A - 1 .  
(A-9) 
e "1 2 ( x '  2 (1' i- A y )  2 
x l  
"Y) 
Referr ing to the reliabil i ty block d iagram for  the Beam Supply, F ig .  4, the 
total  reliability equation for  the Beam Supply is  
R(t)  = R'( t )  R6R7R8Rq ( A -  10) 
where R'( t )  i s  eq.  A - 9  above. 
7 2  
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HEATEX INVERTEES AND CWITCHING CIRCUIT 
Referring to Fid. 6, the relizbility of thc hea ter  inver te rs  and switch- 
ing circui t  is given by 
R(t) = RHeater * R3 . 
Inve r te  r s 
It can be shown that 
where 
A : failure ra te  of operating heater  inver te r  
A ’  : failure ra te  of standby hea ter  inverter ,  assume A ’  = A 
As: failure ra te  of failure sensor  and automatic switch. 
(A-1 1) 
FEED SYSTEM AND NEUTRALIZER MODULATORS 
Since al l  elements a r e  in  ser ies ,  the reliability of the feed sys tem 
and neutral izer  modulators  is given by 
(A-12) 
-ZAit 
R(t) = e (A- 13) 
th where A .  : failure ra te  of the i component par t .  
1 
CATHODE HEATER SUPPLY 
The derivation of this model follows the pattern of that for the Beam 
Supply, except in  this  case  ( see  Fig. A-2) inadvertent switching f rom 
Inverter  No. 1 does not necessar i ly  cause sys tem fai lure .  
73 
To solve for  reliability of the Cathode Heater  Subsystecii let, 
i l : :  
A i  : 
A z  : 
A : failure ra te ,  failure sensor  and switch, operating when 
failure ra te  of a single functioning inver te r  
failure r a t e  of an inver te r  in  standby operation 
failure ra te ,  inadvertent switching I 
required 
A : total  failure ra te  sensor  and switch 
Y 
I h l  = A 2  : where A 2  i s  fa i lure  ra te  of Inver te r  No. 2 when operating on line. 
Then, solving for  probability of success  in  s ta tes  (1) and (2) of 
F i g .  A-2:  
-k1t  - h z t  
P l ( t )  = e e 
P2(t t h)  = Pl(t) X l h  e I 
I 
I 
I 
(A-15) 1 
1 
i 
(A- 16) I 
1 
m 
(A- 14) 
I Solving the above differential equation and substituting P1 (t) and PZ( t )  into the expression 
7 4  
E757-/4 
F i g .  A-2.  Failure  modes for Cathode Heater Supply inver te r  modules 
75 
(A- 17) 
I 
Referring to  the reliabil i ty block d iagram fo r  the Cathode Heater  
(Fig.  9) ,  total  reliability is :  
R(t) = R'( t )  R4 R5 
where R'(t)  is eq.(A-18) above. 
LOGIC AND CONTROL 
Since all e lements  are in  series,  the reliabil i ty of the Logic and 
Control i s  given by 
-FAit 
R(t) = e 
(A-18)  
A-19 
th where h * failure rate of the i component part. i '  
ARC SUPPLY 
Referring to  Fig.  12,  the reliability of the A r c  Supply i s  given by 
R R R R  A-20 
R(t) = PInverters]  5 6 7 8 ' 
7 6  
B ,  
1 
8 
D 
II 
A : total  failure ra te ,  1 monitor and 2 re lays.  
s2 
It can be shown that 
-(A1 + A s  ) t  
= e  1 RInverters  
- ( A  + A s  )t 
2 
+ e  [ A l  +;: - A  
sl s2 
where A : failure ra te  of a single operating inver te r  
h l  : 
A '  : failure ra te  of single inver te r  operating in standby 
A : total  failure ra te ,  2 monitors  and 2 re lays 
failure ra te  of two operating inver te rs  
s1 
As a worst  case  assumption, let A '  = A .  
ACCELERATOR/MAGNET SUPPLY 
Referring to Fig.  14, the reliabil i ty of the Accelerator/Magnet 
Supply is given by 
Inverters  ] R4R5R6R7 . 
and Rect ' s .  
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It can be shown that 
-(la + 13)t 
= e  RInve rte r s 
and Rect's. 
where h l :  failure rate of inverter N a  1 
X2: failure rate of Inverter No. 2 
x 3 :  h l  + x 2  
: failure rate of inadvertent operation of failure monitor 
h Z  
A failure rate of nonoperation of failure monitor when required 
As: total failure rate of failure monitor. 
Y' 
A P P E N D I X  B 
COMPONENT FAILURE RATES AND STRESS SHEETS 
In o rde r  to provide a numerical evaluation of the reliability 
of the power conditioning and control sys tem,  the fai lure  ra tes  of 
the components employed must  be established. 
these failure r a t e s  which must  be based on accepted documenta- 
tion must  consider the s t r e s s  (i. e .  temperature ,  cur ren t ,  voltage, 
etc . ) under which these components will opera te .  
Fur thermore ,  
This  Appendix presents ,  along with a listing of established 
fai lure  r a t e s ,  component s t r e s s  and failure r a t e  tabulation shee ts .  
These s t r e s s  sheets f o r m  the basis  on which the numerical  solution 
of the reliability equations a r e  obtained. Each component in the sys -  
t e m  has been listed with its e lectr ical  and thermal  s t r e s s .  Based on 
the indicated s t r e s s  , the fa i lure-rate  document referenced has been 
used  to  determine the fai lure-rate  at the operating s t r e s s .  
The documents used for fa i lure- ra tes  were those considered 
to be the m o s t  accurate  reflection of recent experience with space 
electronic components. The HAC data,  for example, ref lects  sub- 
stantial  long-term data collected f r o m  Syncom and Ear ly-Bi rd ,  where- 
as the data in  217-A ref lects  the most  recent  derating technique for  
semiconductors,  based on junction tempera tures  r a the r  than ambient 
a i r  t empera ture .  
SUMMARY O F  FAILURE RATES 
The basic fa i lure  ra tes  used in this analysis a r e  listed in 
Table B-I .  
these fai lure  r a t e s  a r e  degraded ( increased)  relative to  the base fai lure  
r a t e  in the manner  specified in MIL  Handbook 217. 
Wherever a component departs  f r o m  the 10% s t r e s s  value, 
There  is  no single source that can he consulted to  obtain fai lure  
r a t e s  for a l l  of t he  components. 
217 and 217A contain fa i lure  ra tes  based on the history of components 
The basic s tandards,  MIL Handbooks 
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Notes on Table B -1 
A .  Mil-Hdbk-217A Capacitor and Res is tor  fa i lure  r a t e s  were  utilized 
directly.  
par t  failure ra tes  were  used. 
Where Hi Re1 (Level  IV) par t s  (were available the equivalent 
The levels chosen f r o m  Mil-Hdbk-217A 
for these four par t s  were :  
Level R - Paper  (or  paper plast ic)  Capac. and Solid Tant Capac. 
Level 0 - Metal Film Res i s to r s  
B. The environment postulated for the mission these par t s  will encounter has  
been se t  conservatively equivalent to  lab  controlled conditions, therefore ,  
an application factor of 1 was assigned. 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
C. Semiconductor failure r a t e s  were  taken f r o m  Mil-Hdbk-217 initially and 
then adjusted to  be consistent with Hughes experience on Space programs 
such a s  Syncom 2 and 3 ,  Earlybird,  and Surveyor.  The pa r t  failure r a t e s  
utilized in the preceding analysis a r e  based on Hughes experience and judge- 
ment for  the postulated pa r t s  mission environment. 
D. Fa i lure  ra tes  for magnetics a r e  derived f r o m  Mil-HDBK-217 modified by 
Hughes extensive experience with Syncom and Ea r ly  Bi rd  Satell i tes.  
I 
8 0  
which a r e  operated pr imar i ly  in a mi l i ta ry  environment and which 
have not been procured under the stringent controls placed on compo- 
nents for a space p r o g r a m .  
f ac to r s  as wide tempera ture  and humidity variations , continued 
mechanical stresses throughout equipment life, handling by person-  
nel,  and many others  which a r e  not found in the benign environment 
of a space miss ion .  
and space environments was observed during Syncom 2 tes t ing.  
ing one year  of ground operation, 17 component fa i lures  were exper-  
ienced whereas the spacecraf t  operated in orbi t  for  over two yea r s  
without a single component failure.  ) However these MIL handbooks 
contain the most  extensive compilation of component fa i lure  his tor ies  
and a s  such, they still m u s t  be relied upon heavily. 
The mi l i ta ry  environment contains such 
(A very  dramatic  comparison between "ground" 
Dur- 
In addition to the mil i tary data ,  t he re  has  been some history 
accumulated on space miss ions .  
Syncom 2 ,  Syncom 3 ,  Earlybird,  and Surveyor p rograms .  The data 
gathered f r o m  the satell i te programs is  ve ry  representative of the 
miss ion  environment being dealt with here ,  since both long t ime dura-  
tion and f r e e  fall operation a r e  involved. The p rocess  of determining 
the fai lure  r a t e s  to be used then becomes one of start ing with the MIL 
handbook a s  a base  and either using these direct ly  o r  altering them 
according to recent  data obtained f r o m  space miss ions .  
cedure used here  emphasized the conservative approach in that a 
safety factor which caused the failure r a t e s  to be higher than est imated 
w a s  employed in most  ca ses .  This procedure was followed in  o rde r  to  
add some contingency for  the fact that  the exact mission has some 
unknowns which cannot be evaluated. 
m e a s u r e s  to insure  high reliability p a r t s  screening during procurement  
would be taken. 
Hughes has compiled data on the 
The pro-  
Finally it was assumed that a l l  
By evaluating each component c l a s s  according to  the above con- 
siderations,  the data presented in Table B-I was developed. 
t icular fa i lure  r a t e  source used in each case  i s  given in  the tab le .  
fa i lure  r a t e s  used for  this analysis have been carefully and conservatively 
The p a r -  
The 
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TABLE B-1 
Basic Fa i lure  Rates 
Base conditions f o r  this  table a r e :  Chassis  Temp.  of 70° and l e s s  than 
0.10 s t r e s s  on each p a r t .  
8 2  
PART TYPE 
Res i s to r  
Capacitor 
Diodes, 
Silicon 
Trans i s to r s  
Silicon 
Integrated 
ckts. 
Magnetics 
PART CATEGORY 
Carbon Composition 
Meta l  Film (Hi Rel )  
Wirewound Pwr. 
Ceramic  
Solid Tantalum 
(Hi Re l )  
Dipped Mica 
Glas s  
Pape r  
Power 
Regulator (Zener  
Power)  
General Purpose-  
low pwr. 
Bridge Rect i f ier  (4) 
SCR 
Power 
General Purpose  
Switching 
Monolithic, Standarl 
Inductors coi ls  & 
chokes , Power 
Trans fo rmer ,  Powe 
F. R. in  70/10 3 h r s .  
00035 
0025 
0009 
. 00020  
.00012 
. 00003 
. 0055 
.00024 
. 008 
.005 
. 002  
. 008 
.0085 
.020 
. 004 
. 002  
00 7 
003 
020 
* 
F. R. Source 
1 
1 (Level 0) 
1 
1 
1 (Level R )  
1 
1 
1 (Level R) 
3 
3 .  
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 
- -~ 
PART TYPE 
Miscell-  
ane ou s 
Conne c - 
t ions 
PART CATEGORY 
T ran  sf o r  m e r  , 
Input Curren t  
Magnetic Ampl. 
Magnetic Ampl. 
The rmis to r  
Relay (one opera- 
tion only) Balance1 
arm Babcock lg.  
Crystal  Can 
Fuse 
P r e s  s u r  e Contact, 
Pin 
Solder Joint 
Fa i lu re  Rate Sources:  
1 .  MIL-HDBK-217A 
3 F. R. in O/oo/lO h r s .  
. 014 
. 020  
.014 
.005 
. 005  
. 0005 
.OOOl 
* 
F. R. Source 
2 
3 
2 
4 
1 
2. Multiple Source - Average to assumed environmental conditions, taking 
note of pa r t s  programs and manufacturing control programs. 
3. MIL-HDBK-217 - curves,  using modified base ra te  
4. HAC Experience: 
Syncom, Earlybird,  Surveyor 
8 3  
chosen to represent  p a r t s  which were representat ive of the e a r l i e r  
Hiighc~s spa( e par t s  programs on which complete data  is known and 
availablr.. lndications f r o m  feedback data  on the cur ren t  space pro-  
grams art’ t h a t  a la rge  improvement in  reliability of p a r t s  and sys -  
tems has been experienced. 
Integrated circui ts  a r e  a c l a s s  of components which because 
of their  newness do not have extensive fa i lure  rate h is tor ies .  Thus,  
assigning a failure ra te  here  i s  not quite so straightforward a s  with 
other p a r t s .  However, industry data is being made  available a s  
yapidly a s  possible and est imates  and predictions can be made based 
on existing information. 
range of failure ra te  i n  1965 was in the range of 0 .005  to  0.2%/1000 
hours .  Reliability growth ra te  of integrated circui ts  is  reflected in 
the Texas Instruments,  I n c . ,  data shown in  F ig .  B-1  and the compiled 
data showxi in Tables B-2  and B - 3 .  
failure ra tes  for  benign environmental operation. 
modified Minuteman grade par t  fa i lure  r a t e s  for  benign environmental 
operation. 
duration tes ts ,  recording of data and individual p a r t  ser ia l izat ion.  The 
p a r t s  controls selected for  the proposed equipment a r e  between these  
two grades  of p a r t s .  
selected a s  a rea l i s t ic  reliability requirement for  the standard mono- 
l i th i  r integrated circui ts  during the t ime period under consideration. 
A nai-nbt<r of suppl iers  a r e  working with Hughes to  supply integrated 
circui ts  to  this fa i lure  ra te  requirement .  
analysis was 0.007%/1000 hours .  
Industry data does indicate that the achievable 
Table B-2  gives MIL grade par t  
Table B - 3 gives 
The modification includes the elimination of cer ta in  long 
A fa i lure  ra te  of 0 . 0 0 ~ 0 / 1 0 0 0  hours has  been 
The fai lure  ra te  used in this 
COMPONENT SELECTION PROCEDURES 
In order  to achieve the maximum reliability, it is  ve ry  impor-  
F i r s t ,  tant to  s ta r t  with the mos t  reliable p a r t s  that can be obtained. 
components must  be selected which have inherently high reliability and, 
second, sufficient constraints must  be placed on the procurement  of 
these pa r t s  such that the best  of the lot a r e  selected.  
84 
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DATA OBTAINED BY EXTRAPOLATING 
125 OC OPERATING TEMPERATURE 
AND 200 OC STORAGE TO 85 OC 
85 OC FAILURE RATE TREND - 
DATE BY QUARTER 
F i g .  B-  1 . Reliability trend char t  fo r  integrated c i rcu i t s .  
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TABLE B-2 
.I, 
Grade 2 Predicted Fa i lure  Rates - Behign Environmental Operation-' 
1969 
Component Generic  
Cat ego r y  
Res is tors  
Capacitors 
Diodes 
T rans i  s t or s 
Transformers  
Chokes and 
Inductors 
Integrated Circui ts  
+solvers  and 
Synchros 
. Basis  
' I  Fa i lu re  Rate %/1000 h r  
Fa i lu re  Rate 
YO/ 1 0 00 h r  
1965 1967 1969 
1965 
Bas is  
0.002 
0.010 
0.010 
0.010 
0.020 
0.010 
0.015 
0.100 
0.002 
0.001 
0.002 
0:003 
0.009 
0.009 
1967 . 
0.0010 0.0005 
C.0005 0.0002 
0.0010 0.00051 
0.0015 0.0008 
0.0030 0.0020 
0.0030 0.0020 
Achieved 
0.001 
0.002 
0.002 
0 .003  
0.009 
0.009 
0.005 
0.100 
0.0010 
0.0100 
, TABLE B-3 
Supplier Data 
Po la r i s  Achieved 
. .  
0.0005 
0.0010 
0.0010 
0.0015 
0.0030 
0.0030 
0.0020 
Pola r i s  Achieved 
Supplier Da ta .  
0.0700 I Pola r i s  Achieved  
1 
1 
I 
* 
C I Grade 2A Predicted Fa i lure  Rates - Benign Environmental  Operation". 
I 
Component Generic 
Category 
Res is tor  6 
Capacitors . 
Diodes 
Trans is tors  
Transformers  
Chokes and 
Induct o r.s 
Integrated Circuits 
Resolvers and 
Synchros 
0.005 
0.100 
0.0020 
0.0700 
I I I 
.b ,,-
Reproduced f r o m  "Quantitative Reliability Prediction, I t  by Owens and 
86 Dolcimascolo, P r o c .  of 1966 Annual Sym.  on Rel .  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Components which a r e  recognized as having inherently high 
reliabil i ty a r e  mos t  readily selected f r o m  lists of space qualified 
pa r t s .  
by NASA as defining space qualified p a r t s .  
recognized as being valid compilations of qualified p a r t s .  Thus,  for  
the mos t  par t ,  selecting high reliability components i s  a ma t t e r  of 
locating a pa r t  type f rom existing documents.  However, there  a r e  
cases  where (s ta te-of- the-ar t  components a r e  used to mee t  per for -  
mance requirements  and yet because of their  newness, they have not 
been qualified. 
initiated in o r d e r  to bring the par t  up to  the proper  level .  
every component in the sys tem should have an accompanying high 
reliabil i ty document which fully defines its charac te r i s t ics  for the 
miss ion  to  be per formed.  
The Hughes documents in the 988000 category are recognized 
The JPL l is ts  are a l so  
In these cases ,  a qualification procedure must  be ’ 
Ultimately, 
In o rde r  to insure  that the very best  control and final pa r t  
selection is obtained, it is necessary  to  place constraints  on procure-  
ment .  A typical example of testing to be performed by the  supplier is 
given below. 
1 .  P r e -  screening tes ts  which consist  of Tempera ture  
Cycling, Centrifuge, Mac r o s c o pi c and Mi c r o s c opi c 
Inspection p r io r  to  sealing 
2. 240 hour intermittent life (1 5 min .  -On, 5 min .  -off) 
at rated power, 
3 .  1260 hours of power aging at half-rated power.  
Readings on the pa r t s  a r e  taken at  0, 240, 250, and 1500 hours .  
Up to  three  times as  many p a r t s  a r e  purchased as requi red .  
on each device is  plotted (by computer) and only those devices which 
remain  stable and within specification are selected for  flight u s e .  
Resident Quality Control Engineers a r e  assigned at each supplier to 
a s s u r e  that the proper  data is recorded, all tests are accomplished 
The data 
87 
and that no !!short  cuts" that would affect  quality are made .  
all pa r t s  received 100 percent  inspection at the suppl iers ,  only 
sample incoming inspection is  per formed.  This inspection is  p r i -  
mar i ly  fo r  reading cor re la t ion .  
Since 
Only a very  br ief  description of the p a r t s  control p rog ram 
necessary  for a space p rogram has been presented .  
recognized that the controls imposed in  this  area have a definite 
affect on component failure rate and as such they have been reviewed 
h e r e .  
Appendix C .  
It should be 
Detailed description of a full p a r t s  p rog ram is provided in 
STRESS SHEETS 
S t re s s  sheets have been developed for each subsystem dis -  
Each  component employed has cussed in Section 111 of this r e p o r t .  
been l isted along with its expected electr ical  and t h e r m a l  stress.  
Finally the failure r a t e s  of each component at operating stress is p r e -  
sented. These stress shee ts  follow. 
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A P P E N D I X  C 
RELIABILITY DOCUMENTS 
i .  Hughes Parts P rogram 
2 .  
3 .  
Hughes Satellite Operational Data Analysis 
How the Exper t s  Pick Reliable Components 
These documents a r e  reproduced he re  to  descr ibe  HAC tech- 
niques of pa r t  screening and the resultant s ta t is t ical  data  accumu- 
lated on failure r a t e s  of par t s  so screened,  on applications such 
as  Syncom and Ear ly-Bi rd .  
i n  t h i s  repor t  for many components, the reference documents will 
substantiate the choice of these latest HAC ra t e s  r a the r  than those of 
ea r l i e r  documents such a s  MIL Hdbk 217 .  
Since these fai lure  r a t e s  have been used 
125 
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HUGHES PARTS PROGRAM 
At the inception of the Syncom Program,  Hughes recognized the necessi ty  for  a m o r e  
stringent and comprehensive p a r t s  program,  and took s teps  to  improve the quality 
of p a r t s  used in satel l i tes .  
satell i te sys tem could not be any bet ter  than the p a r t s  used in  it. As a resu l t  of 
this  each p a r t  used in  the satel l i tes  was t rea ted  as a separa te  entity e .  g . , given 
specific individual attention. 
I 
I 
The basic  philosophy of th i s  p rogram was that the 
I The pa r t s  used were  procured to the requirements  of individual pa r t s  specification which required the suppliers to conduct "burn-in" tes t s  on' each pa r t  and supply 
t e s t  data on a lot basis .  
inspected to  the requirements  of the Procurement  Specification and then placed 
in bonded storage.  
(cumulative t ime of 53 months with one p a r t  fa i lure ,  non catastrophic) a t tes ts  to 
the p a r t s  program. 
Upon receipt  of the pa r t s  a t  Hughes each par t  was 
The highly successful resu l t s  of the Syncom Satellite in orbi t  
The pa r t s  program has  been considerably improved since the Syncom Program.  
The procurement specifications for the Intelsat I ,  Intelsat  2 and ATS (Applications 
Technology Satellite) P r o g r a m s  were  changed to include the following additions by 
the pa r t s  supplier: 
1 
I 
a )  Visual Inspection p r io r  to encapsulation I 
1 
I 
1. P a r t s  a r e  subjected to a 100% pre-screening t e s t  consisting of the 
following a s  a minimum. 
b )  Centrifuge (acceleration) 
c )  Tempera ture  Cycling 
d )  Seal t e s t s  
e )  X-Ray 
f )  Serialization ' 
g )  Elec t r ica l  parameter  tes t s  
2. After the "burn-intt  t e s t  (240 hours intermittent life t e s t )  each par t  is 
subjected to Power Aging up to a total  of 1260 hours .  
been reduced to 510 hours  a s  a result of data analysis ,  e. g. the pa r t s  
become stable a f te r  a cumulative t e s t  time of 750 hours.  It should 
be mentioned that these requirements  apply to semiconductors.  
requirements  a r e  invoked fo r  p a s s i v e  pa r t s .  
P a r a m e t e r  readings a r e  taken a t  0 ,  240 and 750 hours  and identified 
to  each pa r t  s e r i a l  number.  
This has  recently 
I Similar 
3. 
126 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
HUGHES PARTS PROGRAM Continued - . 
4. Up to  3 t imes  a s  many par ts  a s  required a r e  procured. 
5. P a r t s  a r e  selected for flight usage b y  computer program explained la te r .  
6 .  Hughes Quality Engineers monitor each supplier during the manufacture 
and t e s t  of the pa r t s ,  
The pa r t s  upon receipt  a t  Hughes a r e  subjected to sample receiving 
inspection since they had previously been inspected by Hughes Quality 
Pe r sonml  a t  the suppliers facility. 
PARTS QUALIFICATION 
The majori ty  of the pa r t s  fo r  the Proposed Enperiment have been previously 
qualified during the Syncom, Intelsat 1 and 2 and ATS P r o g r a m s  b y  the Hughes 
Components Department. 
Those p a r t s  that have not previously been qualified by Hughes will be subjected 
to qualification t e s t s  that will demonstrate confidence in the adequacy of the pa r t s .  
Hughes Aircraf t  Company's obligation i s  to utilize components p a r t s  that a r e  
appropriately qualified for the end product. 
denotes engineering satisfaction that the design of the component is adequate fo r  
i ts  intended use  and the samples tested satisfactorily met specified requirements.  
Qualification testing is not intended for  evaluating a vendor 's  production capability 
nor to determine the adequacy of a vendor's quality assurance  program. (This 
facet is covered b\ the Quality Control Requirements imposed contractually on 
the suppl iers) .  
In this  context, the t e r m  "qualified" 
That testing necessary  to support past experience and engineering judgment with 
respec t  to the application and the component and manufacturer being considered 
for  approval i s  performed. , 
Testing other than, o r  in addition to, full qualification t e s t s  should .be considered 
when it w 11 provide necessary  and more meaningful information. Special evalua- 
tions and reliability tes t s  a r e  considered and may be used a s  the basis  o r  pa r t  
of the bas i s  for approval. 
The s a m e  rules  and effort involved with the qualification and approval of an 
initial source  is applied to a l l  subsequent sources .  
may be applied to different sources  for the same  i tem where engineering knowledge 
of the vendors and their  components indicates different levels of competency, 
quality o r  design and the r i s k  factor associated with the individual approvals is 
a s s e s  sed a s  being different. 
Varying degrees  of evaluation 
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Under cer ta in  cir cumetances,  additional testing m a y  be desirable  af ter  initial 
approval has  been granted. 
when a problem has developed in the la te r  usage of a component, when a vendor 
makes changes to an  i tem o r  when the r i s k  of its u s e  inc reases  in new o r  m o r e  
seve re  applications. 
of an initial approval o r  to  supplement approval. 
In general ,  post approval t e s t s  w ' l l  be conducted only 
Such t e s t s  m a y  a l so  be conducted to  verify the cor rec tness  
PARTS SCREENING PROGRAM 
General - Hughes Atircraft Company recognizes the need to obtain the best  p a r t s  
available fo r  Communications Satellite P rograms .  The basic  philosophy of the 
p a r t s  program is to subject the p a r t s  to relatively seve re  prescreening t e s t s  to 
cull the weaker par ts .  These t e s t s  do not however exceed the manufac turer ' s  
ratings.  
intermittent life tes t .  During this test, the devices a r e  operated a t  ra ted power 
a t  a specified on-off cycle (depending on the specific device and application). 
Upon successful  completion of the burn-in test the pa r t s  a r e  subjected to power 
aging for an additional 510 hours.  The power aging t e s t  is designed to simulate 
a s  closely a s  pract ical  the stresses the pa r t s  will s ee  in actual  operation. 
The par t s  a r e  then subjected to  a 10-day (240 hours)  "burn-in" o r  
Up to th ree  t imes a s  many pa r t s  a s  required a r e  subjected to the above testing. 
P a r t s  parameters  a r e  recorded a t  0 ,  240 and 750 hours .  
minimum drift  a r e  selected for use.  
Those pa r t s  that exhibit 
The guide l ines for procurement  of electronic p a r t s  and the methods used to 
s c r e e n  rel iable  par t s  a r e  published by the Product  Effectiveness Department. 
The Component Department implements the reliability and quality objectives 
through two basic programs.  
Eleven tasks  a r e  involved in these two basic  programs.  
a s  follows: 
Procurement  Control and Supplier Pa r t e  Screening. 
These a r e  summarized 
1)  Procurement  specification preparat ion 
2)  Procurement  sour'ce control 
3) Qualification of component par t s .  
4)  
5) P a r t  application review 
6 )  Failed p a r t  analysis 
7) Supplier pa r t  screening 
8) P a r t s  qualification s ta tus  list 
Lot acceptance provisions for  components par t s .  
The Quality Control organization provides two additional programs to ensure  that 
the quality and high reliability c r i te r ia  have been accomplished. These a re :  
9) Vendor source  inspection and test verification program.  
10) 7094 Computer p a r t s  data analysis program.  
A detailed description of each of these tasks  and programs follo-ws. 
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PROCUREMENT CONTROL 
Procuremen t  Specification 
Prepara t ion  of Procurement  Specifications - A normal  function of the 
Components Department is the preparation of pa r t s  procurement specifications. 
When conventional Mil i tary Specifications a r e  not adequate for space environ- 
ment  applications, new specifications a r e  prepared  for each par t .  
specifications contain (in detail)  the special  requirements o r  provide supplements 
to existing specifications which a s s u r e  the procurement of the most  appropriate 
and rel iable  par t s .  Hughes past  experience will be used to the fullest extent 
in determining which character is t ics  of the various component pa r t s  should be 
emphasized. Component t e s t s ,  such a s  100 percent burn-in, ex t reme value 
screening,  and other special  tes ts  required of the vendor 
a s s u r e  obtaining highly rel iable ,  d r i f t  stabilized component par t s .  Those t e s t s  
that  a r e  specified in the specification o r  its addendum, require  the vendor to 
submit certified data a s  to t e s t  resul ts  with each production shipment, 
These 
will be required to 
Revision of Procurement  Specifications - In addition to the preparation of the 
procurement  specification, the Components Department is responsible for the 
review and approval of any changes to the specification. Any requests  for 
changes f rom the vendor,  manufacturing, purchasing, engineering, o r  any 
other organization must  be processed and approved by the Components Department. 
These  requests  will be thoroughly reviewed and will be approved only if  the 
change will not affect the suitability o r  reliability of the par t s .  
Procurement  Source Control - The Components Department has  p r imary  
responsibility in the selection of vendors for component pa r t s . .  These vendors 
a r e  limited to those l isted on the procurement  specification and a r e  selected 
on the basis  of the Company's past experience with the vendor, the resu l t s  of 
qualification t e s t s  of the vendor 's  products,  and evaluation of the vendor 's  
capabilities a s  determined by survey inspection of his facil i t ies,  quality control 
and manufacturing procedures .  
Lot Acceptance for Component Pa r t s  - The Components P a r t  Procurement  
Specification includes requirements for  lot acceptance testing to be performed 
by the par t  manufacturer.  
with Hughes 988, 000 pa r t  specifications for semiconductors. Generally, the 
tes t s  a r e  MIL-STD, and consist of tempera ture  cycle, thermal  shock, vibration 
fatigue, shock, and lead fatigue, The resu l t s  of acceptance testing provides 
a s su rance  that the lot of pa r t s  being supplied a r e  substantially of the same  
quality and reliability a s  the lot of pa r t s  originally qualified. 
Lot acceptance t e s t s  will be performed in accordance 
Fa i lure  of a lot to meet  the acceptance c r i te r ia  of the specification i s  sufficient 
evidence for lot rejection; Review of the acceptance tes t  data,  on the failed lot ,  
aids in establishing the necessary correct ive action to be taken by the vendor to 
prevent fur ther  manufacturing discrepancies.  
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I Fur ther  use of the acceptance t e s t  data is made  a s  follows: 
1) 
2 )  
3 )  
4) 
5) 
To determine lot to lot variabil i ty of control and pa rame te r s  
To  provide correlation between in-house and supplier t e s t  data 
To provide a quick par t ia l  qualification of new lots 
To  provide evidence for  disqualification of an  unsatisfactory 
supplier.  
T o  establish necessary  o r  desirable  changes of rating o r  
parameter  l imits.  
Component P a r t s  Application Review - The Components Department has  a 
group of senior component engineers who will  be assigned to the various 
design groups to provide on-the-spot ass i s tance  to the designers  to a s s u r e  
the u s e  of standard reliable par ts .  
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
A minimum of one senior component engineer will participate in each of the 
Communication Satellite Design Reviews. 
each p a r t  in the unit to determine suitability and proper  application. 
to recommend any appropriate changes to the design review chairman and 
follow-up to see  that the drawings a r e  not re leased  until his recommendations 
or  a suitable substitute have been followed. 
or  unknown application, special  t es t s  will be performed to determine the 
suitability and reliability of the application. 
He will review the application of 
He is 
Where indicated by questionable 
Failed P a r t  Analysis - The analysis of failed pa r t s  is initiated by a Trouble 
and Fai lure  Report  (TFR).  
i s  sent to the Components Department for complete analysis.  
is  established by the failure analysis coordinator, and a planned s e r i e s  of 
analysis and investigations i s  undertaken including: 
The failed pa r t  accompanied by a copy of the TFR 
A case  record  
1) Mode of failure review 
2)  Mechanism of failure analysis 
3 )  Physics  of failure studies 
4) Causative 'mater ia l s  analysis 
5) Correlation studies 
6 )  
7 )  P a r t  application liaison 
1 
I P a r t  and type i n f o r m  tion record  
A s  a resul t  of the above analysis,  the Components Department will initiate 
the appropriate correct ive action and supplier liaison on a l l  par t  fa i lures .  
Written replies a r e  required f r o m  the supplier a s  to the correct ive action 
taken, and these repor t s  a r e  filed a s  p a r t  of the failure history. I 
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. Supplier P a r t  Screening 
Screening tes t s  a s  required by the p a r t  specification and the "nature" of the 
p a r t ,  will be performed on electronic pa r t s  to'develop any latent defects. 
p a r t  will receive some combination of the tes ts  descr ibed below, with duration 
and level adapted to provide a nondestructive but mildly accelerated environment. 
Each 
1 ) F o r  Semiconductors 
A l l  p a r t s  a r e  to be ser ia l ized 
T e mp e r a tur e cycle 
Seal  
Centrifuge 
Visual examination (before final assembly)  
Electr ical  parameter  tes t  
High and low temperature  
X-ray (after assembly)  
Intermittent life (240 hour burn-in) * 
End points 
Physical dimens ions 
V ibr a t ion 
Thermal  shcok 
Power ag ing  4:;: 
2 )  F o r  Pass ive  Devices 
a )  Ser ia l  number 
b) X-ray  
c )  Temperature  cycle 
d)  Seal 
e )  Electr ical  acceptance test (T- 1) recorded 
Burn - in :::;: 
Electr ical  acceptance t e s t  (T-2) recorded ::*** 
:: - 
continuous o r  15 minutes on, 5 minutes off, 50 to 100 percent of rated 
power (junction temper a tur e) .  
-l.'h- - Extended power aging is  performed a t  ambient o r  elevated 
tempera ture ,  continuous at 25 to 50 percent of ra ted power for up to 
510 hours .  
Burn-in may be performed a t  ambient or elevated tempera ture ,  
.c .I, 
Burn-in may  be performed a t  ambient o r  elevated temperature,  
Tes t  duration 240 hours.  
.r* .I, .L ~,.,,.,,. - 
continuous, a t  100 to 200 percent of rating. 
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Paramete r  drift  l imits  a r e  applied f o r  T - 1  minus T-2  recordings.  .I, J .  .Ir .L .,,- ,..,..,. - 
P a r t s  Qualification Status Lis t  
The Components Department will c r ea t  a l i s t  of p a r t s  qualified for u s e  on the 
program.  
qualification s ta tus .  
of being qualified and the expected date of completion, 
submitted to the customer o r  a monthly basis .  
Each listing will provide specific identification of the pa r t s  and their  
The l i s t  will  contain those p a r t s  whi,ch a r e  in the process  
These  lists will be 
Vendor Source Inspection and T e s t  Verification P r o g r a m  
The Quality Control Organization will provide qualified personnel to conduct 
source  inspection a t  the p a r t  suppl ier ' s  facility to a s s u r e  that the specification 
screening tes ts  a r e  being conducted. 
a visual inspection during the manufacturer ' s  fabrication and witnesses  the 
s e r i e s  of acceptance tes t s  including the power aging and recdrding of tes t  data. 
His responsibil i t ies a l so  include the repor t ing  of p rogres s  during the manufac- 
turing phases ,  schedule information, problems a r e a s ,  and general  status 
accountability. 
The Hughes Source Inspector per forms 
P a r t s  Data Computer P rogram 
General - A l l  component pa r t s  procured for Communications Satellite P r o g r a m s  
wi l l  be subjected to extensive testing by the vendor and by Hughes Aircraf t  
Company pr ior  to their  u se  in the satel l i tes .  
analysis involving up to three  repeated measurements  on each of seve ra l  
cr i t ical  pa rame te r s  measured  a t  various intervals  during a power aging tes t  
lasting up to 750 hours.  
vendors ,  the data measurements  taken a t  the tes t  intervals will be submitted 
to Hughes par t  selection computer program for  the selection of the best  pa r t s  
within the lots. 
confirmation of the vendor ' s  resu l t s .  
var idus types of analysis performed by the 7094 Computer in making i t s  
selection of prototype and flight par t s .  
Components T e s t  Data - 
inst ruct  each of the component manufacturer to submit component pa r t s  
t e s t  data for each device supplied. 
to a series of burn-in and power aging tes t s  and will periodically measu re  a 
se t  of one to four cr i t ical  pa rame te r s  of the device. 
have a s  many a s  12  pa rame te r s  readings,  a s  shown in Table  1. 
The pa r t s  will  be given a complete 
Although most  of these tes t s  will be performed by the 
A l s o ,  samples  of incoming pa r t s  will be tested to obtain 
The following sections descr ibe the 
For  the pa r t s  procurement  program,  Hughes will 
The manufacturer will subject the pa r t s  
Each device then may 
1 
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PROCUREMENT CONTROL Continued - . 
Intermittent burn-in 25C hours,  
T A B L E  1 P A R A M E T E R  R E A D I N G S  
Continuous power aging, 
Tes t  Interval 
T -  1 
T-2 
T - 3  
A 
XA 1 
XA2 
XA3 
PARAMETER 
B 
XB1 
XB2 
XB3 
x c 2  
x c 3  
XD2 
XD3 
All of the data on l ine T - 1  will be on one IBM Card,  Data of l ine T-2 
will be on a second ca rd ,  etc.  Readings of 1 2 ,  3.  and 4 cr i t ica l  pa rame te r s  
wil l  be taken a t  th ree  different times during the burn-in and power aging test. 
(See Table 2 )  
T A B L E  2 P A R A M E T E R  R E A D I N G  T I M E S  
100 percent  ra ted power a t  25OC 
15 minutes on 
5 minutes off 
510 hours. 
50-percent ra ted power 
2 5OC 
G hour . 
T-1 
240 hours 750 hours 
T-2  T-3  
The cr i t ical  parameter  readings taken a t  T-1 ,  T-2,  and T-3  will  be punched 
on IBM Cards.  The cr i t ical  parameters  readings will be those pa rame te r s  
previously chosen by the Components Department, a s  the pa rame te r s  which 
a r e  most  significant to device screening. The result ing test data will be 
t ransmit ted to Hughes Quality Control within 72 hours af ter  the readings 
have been taken a t  each test time. 
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I 
Computer Data Reduction - The computer program,  which will be utilized for  
the Communications Satell i te P r o g r a m s  to select  the prototype and flight pa r t s ,  
is statist ical  i n  nature.  
by a vendor for a purchase o r d e r ,  the IBM Cards  a r e  verified for their  
correctness  and content. 
pa r t  and purchase o rde r  number,  until T - 3  data is received, etc. , and after 
As the data ca rds  (T-1, T-2  and T-3)  a r e  submitted 
The data (T-1 and T-2 )  is logged and s tored,  by 1 
I verification a l l  of the data is ready to be joined with the computer program deck. 
1 
1 
1 
The computer p rogram is the same  fo r  a l l  par t s .  
each type of par t .  
l imits  for a l l  pa rame te r s  measured  by the vendor during testing. 
to the specification l imits ,  other l imits  a r e  pu t  in the computer,  such a s  dr i f t  
delta change f r o m  consecutive tes t  intervals ,  etc.  
up by Quality Control and a r e  joined with data and program deck for the 
computer r u n .  
electronic pa r t s .  
A control card  is made  for 
In addition 
The Components Department provides the p a r t  specification 
The control cards  a r e  made 
Figure 1 shows the p a r t  and paper control flow for a l l  
1 
I 
The computer is programmed to print  the pa r t  number,  purchase order  
number,  date,  and al l  general  information about that p a r t  type. Next, i t  
pr ints  a l l  the  data by tes t  interval and by parameter .  The following page 
c a r r i e s  by pa r t  s e r i a l  number any p a r t  which may  have missing data on the 
card ,  o r  out-of-specification da ta .  
a r e  deleted f rom the computer analysis.  
r e l ease  order  which goes to project  s to re s  and defines the selected par t s ,  and 
a r e  handled a s  discrepant mater ia l  by the Mater ia l  Review Board. 
When p a r t s  fall  into this category, they 
These pa r t s  will not appear on the 
1 
I 
Once this i s  accomplished, the computer proceeds to per form i t s  computations. 
In the case of a four-parameter  pa r t  type, the first page of the analysis will 
l i s t  a l l  the general  information such a s  the vendor, purchase order  number,  
i t em number,  and Hughes p a r t  number.  The upper and lower specification 
l imits  for each pa rame te r ,  the Mean and Standard Deviation f o r  each pa rame te r ,  
the Mean of Delta X for .each pa rame te r ,  and the standard deviation X of Delta 
X for  each pa rame te r ,  plus the added controls,  such a s  lot distribution sigma 
l imits  for the pa r t  type. 
I 
I 
To obtain the analysis resu l t s  for each pa r t  type by i t s  s e r i a l  number,  the 
computer s to re s  a l l  the data on the cards .  I t  is programmed to calculate the 
mean and standard deviation of the total lot b y  each parameter  for every t e s t  
interval.  This represents  four pa rame te r s  a t  t h ree  t e s t  intervals,  for a 
total 12 numerical  distribution plots. In addition, the computer calculates 
the mean and the standard deviation of the delta change of the total lot by 
each parameter  for the test intervals (T-1 - T-2),  (T-2 - T-3)  and ("-1 - T3) .  
This represents  another 12 numerical  distribution plots. The program util izes 
the pa rame te r ' s  upper and lower specification l imi t s ,  plus sigma limits and 
I 
I 
€757-5 
I 
F i g .  1 .  Pa r t s  and paper  flow. 
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delta,  change sigma limits (2 6), to f r a m e  a l l  the test readings. 
lat ions,  the computer overlays the above 12 numerical  distribution plots,  
calculated for the pa rame te r s  X t e s t  interval  (T-1 ,  T - 2 ,  T - 3 )  with the 13. 
numerical  distribution plots calculated f o r  the delta change (012, b 2 3 ,  A 13)  
X t e s t  intervals (T-1,  T - 2 )  to select  the p a r t s  by s e r i a l  number that exhibit 
the most  s table  charac te r i s t ics .  
to weigh its calculations, a key parameter  is designated by the Components 
Department. 
determined.from the p a r t  type and design applications. 
computer can rank i t s  selection. 
r a the r  by p a r t  s e r i a l  number sequence and is used a s  a re lease  o rde r .  
In its calcu- 
In o r d e r  f o r  the computer to determine and 
The other pa rame te r s  a r e  designated in descending o rde r  a s  
In this manner ,  the, 
The printout is not in a rank o rde r  file but 
1 
I 
I 
1 
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INTRODUCTION 
This i s  the fourth i n  a continiious ser ies  of progress reports on the Space 
Systems Division Rel iab i l i ty  and Maintainability S ta f f ' s  operational 
sa te l l i t e  monitoring e f for t .  The s a t e l l i t e s  currently monitored are 
Syncom 11, Syncom I11 and E a r l y  Bird. The purpose of the project is to  
modify current ground environment part  f a i lu re  ra tes  to  r e f l ec t  the space 
environment. An important advantage i n  using par ts  data  from actual Hughes 
b u i l t  systems rather than par t  l i f e  tests i s  tha t  i t  i s  no longer necessary 
t o  assume perfect design u t i l i za t ion ,  fabr icat ion,derat ing or  environment. 
RESULTS 
As of 31 March 1966, exactly one p a r t  f a i lu re  has occurred i n  the electronics 
of the aforementioned s a t e l l i t e s  - a 2N2185 PNP analog t rans is tor  located i n  
a telemetry encoder of Syncom 11. The f a i lu re  i s  known t o  have occurred in 
the in te rva l  8 August t o  22 October 1964. Two temporary losses of capabi l i ty  
have occurred, neither of which could be termed a par t  f a i l u r e  as such. 
Failures have occurred i n  the H 0 control systems, e.g. s t icking valves, and 
these s h a l l  be treated i n  the Appendix. 2 2  
Given the current SSD ground environment* f a i lu re  r a t e s ,  the probabili ty of 
only one par t  f a i l u r e  t o  date is .04.  That i s  t o  say, the hypothesis t ha t  
the ground environment f a i lu re  ra tes  are not too high f o r  synchronous 
sa t e l l i t e  application may b e  rejected with a .04. probability. of error of 
the f i r s t  kind. 
A K factor  which may be applied to  a HAC b u i l t  s a t e l l i t e  having roughly the , 
same parts  mixture has been calculated. This K factor  i s  a function of the . 
number of f a i lu re s  observed and the t o t a l  par t  operating hours and, thus, is 
a random vari'able. w 
The current unbiased and maximum likelihood estimate** of K i s  .20 while an 
80% confidence in te rva l  is  1.045, .717]. 
* See Table  1 
** See "Hughes S a t e l l i t e  Operational Data Analysis, 31 March 1965 
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This means tha t  i f  a par t s  count fa i lure  rate prediction on the electronics  
on a Hughes synchronouo spinning oatellife uoing current SSD ground environ- 
ment f a i lu re  ra tes  (see Table 1) gave a mean l i f e  of 8 years, the bes t  
estimate of the t rue  mean l i f e  i n  the space environment would be 8/.2=58 years. 
Although K w i l l  converge t o  the "true" K factor f o r  large samples,  our sample 
t o  date  is re lat ively small and large variations i n  K may be observed from 
report  to  report. 
Since no p a r t  type  has accumulated enough operating hours to  represent i t s  
ground environment mean-time-to-failure, there is not enough evidence to  
indicate  which parts a re  responsible f o r  the increased l i f e .  Therefore, i f  
the f a i l u r e  r a t e  of any specif ic  par t  i n  the space environment is  required, 
i t  would be incorrect to  merely assume .2 times the ground environment 
f a i l u r e  rate unless the par t  were t o  be used along with a l l  the others and 
i n  roughly the same proportions as i n  Syncom and Early Bird. Therefore, 
individual best  estimates of each par t  type based only upon i t s  operating 
hours have been provided i n  Table 1 f o r  the case i n  which individual par t  
f a i l u r e  rates are needed. 
I 
I 
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TABLE ‘1 
SSD Ground 
Operating Envi r o nme n t Best 80% Confidence N Error t o  - 
Time Failure Rate E s  tiinate Interval Reject Ground 
Part Typ e lo5 P a r t  Hours Fail/Hr. lo” Fail/Hr. Fail/Hr. Failure Rate 
Capacitors 
Ceramic 154.143 
G1 as s 72.009 
Paper 3.737 
Tantalum 20,239 
Connectors 
COAX 33.773 
Others .948 
Crystals 1.119 
Diodes 
m e r a l  Purpose 21,493 
Mixer 
Switching 
Varac tor  
Zener 
High Voltage 
Ferr i te  Devices 
Coils, Chokes 
Inductors 
Transformers 
R e s  i s t o r s  
Carbon 
F i l m  
Wire Wound 
Trans i s  tors  
Analog 
Digi ta l  
.466 
56.914 
14.116 
.631 
1.413 
8,378 
82.398 
17.073 
184.000 
29,265 
2.320 
31.698 
40.356 
Tuneable Cavities 2.585.., 
S ‘er o r  Weld 
bonnections 2,134.464 
TWT .375 
F i l t e r s  . 1.632 
Senei t o r s  .079 
.002 .0016 
.OOl .0009 
.002 .0020 
.010 ’ .0086 
.004 .0036 
.010 .0099 
.020 .0196 
.005 .0046 
.040 .0394 
.002 .0018 
.loo .0590 
.010 .0090 
.030 .0295 
.loo .0895 
.007 .0047 
.014 .0117 
:001 .0009 
.005 .0045 
.010 .0098 
.OlO .0145 
.005 .0043 
.010 .0098 
.00023 
.5338 
.0004 
.640 
N.A. 1J.A. 
.010 .OlOO 
.ooo , .012 
.ooo , .090 
. 000, .025 . 000 , .486 
. 000 , .054 
.000,1.919 
.000,1.625 
,000,. 085 
.000,3;907 
.OOO, ,032 
.OOO, .217 . 000, .129 
.000,2.851 
.Of lO ,1 .287  
.ooo , .022 
. 000, . lo7  
.ooo, .009 . 000 , .062 
.OOO, .784 
.007, .lo9 
.OOO , .045 
.OOO, .704 
.000,.0009 
.OOO ,4.85 
.000,1.114 
.000,23,052 
.735 
.931 
.993 
.817 
.873 
.991 
.977 
.898 
.9F2 
.892 
.433 
.868 
.981 
.868 
.562 
.787 
.831 
.864 
.977 
1 
.959 
.817 
.974 
.426 
, .786 
N.A. 
.999 
139 
IDC 2207.1/53 dated 13 April 1966 
R. J. Schulhof to R. M. Bentley 
Page 4 
Further Calculations Using Data i n  Table 1 
Expected number of p a r t  fa i lures  i f  the SSD ground f a i lu re  rates are correct: 4.944 
Observed fai lures:  1 
1 '  -- = .202 observed fa i lures  expected f a i lu re s  4.944 K factor  = 
80% confidence inperval f o r  K factor  ,045 S K S .717 
Probability of one f a i lu re  o r  less using SSD ground environment f a i lu re  rates 
(reject ion error):  .043 
Explanation of en t r ies  i n  Table 1 
1) Operating t i m e  - actual t o t a l  par t  operating hours f o r  p a r t  type i n  Hughee 
s a t e l l i t e s  t o  31 March 1966. 
2) SSD ground environment f a i lu re  rate. Current ground environment f a i lu re  
r a t e  used for parts count f a i lu re  rate predictions by SSD Rel iab i l i ty  and 
Maintainability Staff.  
3) 80% confidence interval.  An interval  based on the operating hours i n  (1) 
which contains the t r u e  synchronous, spinning sa t e l l i t e  space environment 
f a i l u r e  rate with probability a t  l e a s t  .80. 
4)  Best Estimate. Best estimate fo r  synchronous, spinning sa t e l l i t e  space 
environment fa i lure  r a t e  based on SSD ground environment f a i lu re  rate 
individual operating hours i n  space, and number of fa i lures  occurrihg 
sui table  f o r  use separate from other parts. 
5 )  Rejection Error. Probability of e r ror  of the f i r s t  kind i f  the SSD ground 
environment f a i l u r e  r a t e  f o r  the specif ic  p a r t  i s  rejected a t  t h i s  t i m e .  
The method of analysis f o r  the above may be found i n  "Hughes S a t e l l i t e  
Operational Data Analysis" f o r  31. March 1965. 
Prepared by: 
R. J. Schulhof 
Approved by: 
E. J. Althaus 
R JS : mjw 
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ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL DATA 
HYDROGEN PEROXIDE SUBSYSTEMS 
The a n a l y s i s  of d a t a  for the hydrogen peroxide subsystems i s  complicated 
by the f a c t  t h a t  two d i f f e r e n t  types of f a i l u r e s  m u s t  be considered. 
1) f a i l u r e  due t o  a c t u a l  ope ra t ion  - i.e., dependent upon cyc le s  
of o p e r a t i o n ,  
2 )  t i m e  dependent f a i l u r e s  - such as those caused by co r ros ion .  
Assuming t h a t  t h e  f o r c e s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t i m e  dependent f a i l u r e s  are inde- 
pendent of  those due t o  c y c l e s  of ope ra t ion ,  w e  may assume t h e  f a i l u r e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  t o  be approximately Poisson, i.e., i f  w e  have n i d e n t i c a l  dev ices ,  
t h e  i ( t h )  one having been i n  o r b i t  f o r  ti hours  and having been used i n  ci 
c y c l e s  of  o p e r a t i o n ,  t h e  number of par t  f a i l u r e s  would approximately have 
t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
N n n  n 9 
i=l i=l 
. i=l i=l f(N) = e 
..-. 
 
N! 
where 1, i s  t h e  t o t a l  t i m e  dependent f a i l u r e  rate f o r  a u n i t  and A 
t o t a l  c y c l e  dependent f a i l u r e  rate f o r  a u n i t .  
is  t h e  
C 
I f  f a i l u r e s  can be  i d e n t i f i e d  as time dependent o r  c y c l e  dependent, w e  may 
estimate the parameters h t  and 1 independently by 
C 
t o t a l  t i m e  dependent f a i l u r e s  t o t a l  c y c l e  dependent f a i l u r e s  
'AC 2 ti 
. i=l 
Tti 
i=1 
To d a t e  no c y c l e  dependent f a i l u r e s  have occur red ,  b u t  two time dependent 
f a i l u r e s  have occurred:* 
1) The 1,ateral so l eno id  v a l v e  i n  Syncom 2 f a i l e d  to  open. 
2)  A p res su re  r e l i e f  valve i n  System I of Syncom 3 f a i l e d  t o  open. 
The "calendar" t i m e  on each system i s  de f ined  as: 
o p e r a t i o n  - t i m e  of l i f t  o f f .  Time a t  l a s t  s u c c e s s f u l  
~ ~~ ~- 
* See Hughes Communication S a t e l l i t e s  Opera t iona l  Sumary.  
1 4 1  
I .  
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The ca l enda r  time may b e y c a l c u l a t e d  from t h e  t a b l e  below: - -.-- 
!. 7t '  , . _*a. % - .  - - .  
DATE OF LAST LIFT OFF 
SYSTEM OPERATION DATE HOURS 
Syncom 2 7-3-64 7-26-63 8,200 
I &  
Syncom 3 System I 10-29L65 7-19-64 9,000 
System I1 7- 16-65 7- 19- 64 8,700 
HS-303 System I 
System I1 
4-14-65 . 4-6-65 
12-2-65 4-6-65 
200 
5,700 
Total 31,800 
Note: Hours are rounded to t h e  n e a r e s t  hundred. 
The number of cyc le s  is as fol lows:  
SYSTEM CYCLES 
Syncom I1 2820 
Syncom 111, System I 1835 
System I1 255 
HS-303 System I 1704 
System I1 1495 
~ 
To t a l  8109 
A system c o n s i s t s  of one r a d i a l  j e t ,  one a x i a l  jet ,  p r o p e l l a n t  tanks ,  f i l l  
ven t  and r e l i e f  va lve ,  p re s su re  reducer ,  and manifolding. 
90% confidence i n t e r v a l s  on At  and A,, assuming t h e  number of  each type of 
f a i l u r e  has a Poisson d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  may be c a l c u l a t e d  as 
[O s Ac s 30 x 
C1.6 s A, 9 18.8 x f a i lu re s /hour .  
f a i l u r e s / c y c l e  
The pre l iminary  estimate of t h e  t o t a l  time dependent f a i l u r e  q t e  used i n  
r e l i a b i l i t y  p r e d i c t i o n s  on Syncom and E a r l y  Bi rd  was 2.3 x 10 
The expected number of f a i l u r e s  using t h i s  f a i l u r e  rate is .731. 
The d a t a  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the space environment is a t  least  as bad as had been 
p r e d i c t e d  f o r  e x i s t i n g  H O2 s u b s y s t e q  a l though,  at t h i s  t i m e ,  t he  d i f f e r e n c e  
i s  no t  h i g h l y  r ign i f i ceng .  
f a i l u r e l h o u r .  
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muiMiziie. THE 
PROCUREMENT 
FUNCTIOW 
A PRO IN RELIABILITY since its 
cvrlicst days. C. M. Ryerson, now 
at Hughes Aircraft, reported how 
degradation screening of highest 
quality component parts was ac- 
complished for Syncom. Early 
Bird. ATS satcllitc and the Sur- 
\cycr Moon Lander. 
On Early Bird 19,000 parts 
( 100% ) were screened using pow- 
er-on aging test. Degradations of 
one to four paramcters were meas- 
ured at four time intervals for each 
serialized part and then analyzed 
by data processing. Each part was 
then carmarked for flight or 
ground use. As many as 30 per- 
Degradation Path 
IS Due to Part Reliability 
PATH -NOT VALUE 
IDEAL 
L L  
UL, . I bLl COMMONLY 
GOOD 
L L  
UPNdjBLE 
I 
L L  
How the E~utrfs Pick 
Approaches used by a number of companies were 
detailed at 1966 Annual Symposium On Reliability 
Hughes, GE, Bellock & NASA Experiences Detailed 
Detailed Screening Resuhr of Hughos !itudy 
- l h  
CAPACITOR 
Tantalum 
Paper-Mylar 
Glass 
Ceramic 
Mica Button 
Ceramic standoff 
TC Ceramic 
REsmom 
Carbon Film . 
Carbon Film 
Carbon Film 
Metal Film 
Scnsistor 
Thermistor 
W.W.. 
W.W. 
DIODE 
i ~ 3 0 7 0  
1N702A (Zener) 
1N1313 (Zener) 
1 N3595 
1N1184 
1 N3062 
1N3MO aerier-1 
-2 
RIZm, Rwoo 
1N297OB (Zener) 
TRANSISTOR 
2N1709 
Fpmily 2N1724 
Family 2N21M 
2N918 
2N1506A 
2N2997. 2N1405 
2N1141 
2N871 
2N1717 
2N1936 
2N2920 
2N2906. 2N2907 
2N2484 
2N2608, 2N3882, 
Zcmr Special 
2 ~ 7 0 8  T:O 240 750 1000 
HOURS 
Q...tlb' 
P=ts 
remhcd. 
1348 
148 
2860 
341 
187 
260 
141 
(100%) 
2471 
1 2 6  
626 
1465 
50 
12 
79 
27 
(100%) 
185 
142 
115 
3087 
56 
261 
168 
904 
68 
46 
( ~ W O )  
21 
56 
106 
45 
445 
40 
580 
99 
104 
1% 
19 
88 
42 
872 
1610 
27 
20 
36 
(too%@) 
218 
96 
Q.rar -
fmm 
8l7 
102 n 10 
203 
148 
226 
92 
0 1  . o w  
1421 
97 
430 
916 
45 
12 
26 
17 -- 
(61.oSg) (21.9%) 
138 47 
1 14 17 
91 19 
2522 489 
34 22 
229 31 
0 148 
6N m .  
51 I8 
35 * 10 . 
(76.9%) (19.9%) 
14 0 
4 I5 
6s 37 
35 7 
358 84 
n 13 
473 7a 
66 27 m '  24 
156 32 
15 0 
37 38 
-- 
27 11 
549 247 
907 84 
19 5 
14 6 
80 '10 
0 
<17.1%) . 
0 
I1 
5 
76 
0 
1 
aD 
42 
1 
1 
0.2%) ' 
7 
0 
1 
3 
' 3  
0 
29 
6 
0 
8 
4 
13 
3 
19 
3 
0 
0 
WW 
n 
-
a 
14 a 
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ccnt of the Iiighcsl quality parts 
which passcd the scrcening tests 
were considcrcd not suitable for 
flight use - evcn though opera- 
tional parameters wcrc still within 
spec limits. 
Rycrson assumed different lots 
of supposedly identical lots could 
havc significant reliability differ- 
cnccs depending on how well the 
\upplicr had the process under 
control and how good his qualifi- 
cation tcchniques were. Ryerson 
says four categories of supplier re- 
liability arc: crude lot (no specific 
rcliability), mixed lot (several de- 
finable lcvels of reliability), qual- 
ity lot (mostly high reliable parts), 
Typical Indicator Parameters 
Used by Hughes 
Tantalnm capadtors 
Leakage current at 25’C 
Capacitance at 25°C 
Dissipation factor at 25°C 
Leakage current at 65°C 
Paper mylar capacitors 
Insulation Resistance at 25°C 
Capacitance at 25°C 
Dissipation factor at 25’C 
Insulation Resistance at R5”C 
Class Capacltas 
Capacitance at 25°C 
Dissipation factor at 25°C 
Insulation resistance at 25°C 
C m a l c  capacltom 
Insulation resistance at 25°C 
Capacitance at 25°C 
Power factor at 25°C 
Insulation resistance at 85°C 
Mlca button a p d t o n  
Insulation resistance at 25°C 
Capacitance at 25OC 
“ Q  at 25% 
Insulation resistance at 85°C 
FUI ndstors 
Resistance at 25OC 
Noise at 25°C 
Dlodcs 
1, reverse leakage 
V forward voltage drop 
TZBV thermal coefficient 
V, zener voltage 
2, zener impedance 
TRaalston 
h,, beta 
I,.,,,, leakage current 
P, power gain 
V,, (sat) saturation voltage 
hPI5,/hlrkl beta ratio 
1 leakage current (drain to source) 
I””’ leakage current (eate to source) d q E 0  breakdown voltage (collector 
V, gate to  m i c e  pinch-off volt- 
to emitter) 
MC. at reverr-biased drain 
and screened lot (contains no ob- 
viously unreliable parts). For this 
reason, the Hughes expert said it 
was futile to test any lot for relia- 
bility without first determining lot 
failure characteristics. 
“Mean lot reliability has its 
maximum significance only when 
derived from lots screened for po- 
tcntial rejects,” he said. 
Degradation the Key 
Hughes finds each part has cer- 
tain “tell-tale’’ parameters that usu- 
ally indicate potential or incipient 
unreliability. Tests to spot para- 
meter shifts were usually from 
1000 to 1500 hours long. All parts 
of a lot were tested and cycled on 
a power-on-off schedule patterned 
after normal use schedules. Load 
and temperature conditions were 
usually maximum (the degradation 
test itself indicated if the maxi- 
mum conditions were too severe). 
Thc exact parameter values at 
thc start and finish of the test were 
considered less important than the 
tlegrarkurion path in relation to lim- 
its set. 
Ryerson warned that the usual 
approach of rejecting values in 
tails outside set distribution limits 
(at the end of power-aging tests) 
could bc wrong. He demonstrated 
that even if the part showed very 
littlc degradation (indicating reli- 
ability), it might fall in the tail 
iireil if  it were near the limit in 
the first place and be automatically 
rcjcctcd. Other parts which 
started in the middle of the dis- 
tribution could exhibit two or three 
sigma instability and still be ac- 
cepted. The clue, therefore, is the 
actual plot of each part. (See 
curves.) 
A total of 15 million part hours 
wcre chalked up in screening the 
19,000 parts (510 line items in 143 
part types) for the Early Bird. 
All tests were run by the sup- 
plier and the test results were key- 
punched on IBM cards either by 
the supplier or Hughes. 
Analysis was made on an IBM 
7094 computer. The analysis in- 
volved sorting, computing figures 
of merit, ranking of parameters and 
figures of merit, distribution analy- 
sis and print out in various presen- 
tations. 
Best parts were rated flight 
grade. Less than best but not re- 
jects were used for non-flight serv- 
including the 30 percent rejected 
were well within normal quality 
acceptance standards. Degradation 
testing, as Ryerson sees it, is not 
a substitute for tight quality con- 
trol, but should be used in addi- 
tion to quality control. 
Detailed screening results as 
well as typical indicator parame- 
ters are shown. 
Combination Testing at  GE 
Acceleration testing of compo- 
nents is the goal of every reliability 
engineer and H. W. Endicott and 
T. M. Walsh of G E  Spacecraft 
Dept. think they have the answer. 
Writing in the Symposium Pro- 
ceedings, these two gentlemen de- 
scribe how they combine step- 
stress testing and constant-stress 
testing to quickly evaluate the life 
of components. 
In a test of resistors, for exam- 
ple, they found that the degrada- 
tion mechanism was such that step 
stress data could have been used 
to predict with accuracy the re- 
sults of long-time constant stress 
results. 
Endicott and Walsh conclude 
that two step-stress tests and three 
constant-stress tests are the best 
procedure for a complete compo- 
nent evaluation. 
The report, “The two step-stress 
tests indicate the stress limita- 
tions of the part (in conjunction 
with f a i l u r e  ana lyses  of t h e  
failed parts) and provide informa- 
tion for selecting the stress levels 
for the constant-stress tests. Proper 
analysis shows the stress levels and 
failure mechanism relationship with 
time. Results of the combined 
tests provide information on the 
failure distribution and data points 
for constructing a life versus stress 
curve.” 
Step stressing alone is useful for 
lot acceptance, quality control, re- 
qualification and evaluation of 
screening techniques once the re- 
lation between step stressing and 
constant stressing is known. 
Step stressing is fast, and useful 
results are obtained even though 
large variations in lot quality exist, 
the authors say. Constant testing 
(Continued on next page) 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
ice. As mentioned, 30 percent of 
the parts tested were rejected. 
Ryerson points out I that the 
value of the degradation testing 
lies in the fact that all of the parts I 
m:iy f i l i i  Ai Ixirts if li-\c.l is  
high. o r  none i f  too low. 
(‘onstnnt stress ;ilonc is okay 
\vlicn the iipproxin1:Itc quul i ty  of 
parts is known. A the proper high 
Ic\.cl of stress failure. dcgrxhtion 
is provided in ii short tinic. Use of 
three stress Icvcls makes i t  possible 
to relate failure to stress and time. 
This. information can be cxtrapo- 
Iiitcd for failure at vilrious dcratcd 
Icvcls. 
Details on the coniplctc plan 
arc cowrccl in thc Proceedings. 
Replacement Rates lower 
After studying thc rcplacemcnt 
rate o f  componcnts in four niili- 
titry systcnis. 1 .  L. Tancr of Bcll 
Tclephonc Labs has come up \vitli 
sonic ne\\ data. He finds that thc 
rcplaccnicnt rate f o r  most conipo- 
ncnts a rc  one order o f  magnitude 
Io\ver than those s h o ~ m  in MIL 
Taner‘s Estimated Replace- 
ment Rates When Applied to 
Solid State Computer Systems. 
Replacement Rate/ 
Component IO‘ Component Hn. 
Re\lslors 
Flxcd  
Carbon Compiirition 1 
C w b m  Film 1 
Metal Film 1 
POW er Wircu ound 4 
Carbon io  
Variable 
H ircuound 4u 
con. RF I O  
R u c t a .  Power 10 
Transformers 
rower 20 
Audio 20 
RF 30 
Pulrc 20 
Low Level, Scaled 100 
\ l ~ C U C  
Relay, Amature 
Capacitors 
Flxcd 
Ceramic 30 
Glass 0 I 
M c a  0 3  
Paper 10 
Plastic 5 
Aluminum 40 
Sohd Tantalum 5 
Wet Tantalum 30 
ElccbolytlC 
Scmlcooductors 
DlodcS 
Low Power-Ge rn 
Low Power-Si 5 
Med. Power& n 
Zener-.% in 
Low Power-Gc 20 
Low Power-Si 10 
Mcd. Power-Si 20 
High Power-Si 200 
Truslston 
H;ii;db(::)k 2 ! ?  c x x p t  for some 
resistors and g lass  capac i to r s  
which ;ire two magnitudes lower. 
(See table.) 
The improvcmcnts arc due to 
gcneral advances in the state of 
the art, according to Taner. He 
iniplied -thcsc ncw figures can be 
itscd for system reliability predic- 
tion purposes. 
Taner reported that no wear- 
out phenomena were present for 
dcviccs in  low-signal level ‘applica- 
tions. 
Basic causes of failures (which 
wcrc mostly catastrophic) can be 
traced to imperfection in compo- 
ficnt. workmanship errors in as- 
sembling and testing, and human 
crror in assembling. 
Bcll Telephone experience in 
dcsigning and manufacturing sub- 
niarinc cable repeaters leads 
Taner to belic\.e more reliability in 
military systems can be achieved 
if  grcatcr precautions are taken 
to eliminate human errors through- 
o u t  m ;in u f ac t u r in g and instal 1 at ion 
proccsscs. He said greater empha- 
sis should bc placed on training 
and education of all who affect 
reliability. 
NASA Experience Similar 
The experience of NASA (Na- 
tional Acronauticnl and Space Ad- 
ministration) leads W. M. Redler 
of NASA‘s Office of Reliability 
i!t?d Qu:l!ity .As.;iir;incc t o  conclu- 
sions similar to Taner’s. “The 
greatest problem is that of getting 
sufficient quality control and care 
in the production. handling, stor- 
ing. testing, fastening and applica- 
tion of parts and associated ma- 
tcrials.“ Redler states. 
A breakdown of Saturn failures 
(including the Pegasus spacecraft) 
indicates the problem. Vehicle and 
ground ’ support equipment are 
cowred. 
Opera- 
Saturn Design Quality tional 
Suniber Problems Problems Problems 
SA- 1 9 38 109 
SA-? 14 12 114 
SA-3 13 32  138 
SA-5 41 248 293 
SA-6 54 194 215 
SA-7 71 I I9 268 
SA-8 118 290 286 
SA-9 15 214 252 
SA-10 ‘29 206 20 1 
S A 4  1 ,3 9 95 
Many quality and some opera- 
tional problems are due to human 
High Reliability Parts Failure 
Rates That Can Be Used in 
Estimating Reliability of Elec- 
tronic Space Systems. 
% loo0 b u r ~  aay. cknftdmce Lcvel 
Lowest Lorra  
Part Typ Estimated Indlcatcd 
Battery. NI-Cad .04 .022 
Capacitors 
Fixed Gleaa .M)(flS 
Flxed Mlca .o0015 812 
Fixed Mylar .m .M7 
Fixed Ta, Solid .001 .010 
’ Var. Glass .0035 .017 
Connectors , 
Multipin 
(per pin) .WOO07 .008 
coaxial .m1 .044 
Diodes .OOO4 .00052 
Inductors .00095 .013 
Integrated Ckts .004 .o 1 
Memory Cores .oooO5 
Retays, 10 amp 0.3% /lO,OOO ops, 90% CL 
Relays, Latching .1 (MIL-HDBK 
Resistors 
Fixed Ceramic .ooO1 ,0006 
217 value) .037 
Fixed Film .m02 .ooo24 
Fixed Comp. .0002 30024 
Fixed WW .001 
Solar Cells .o001 .00014 
Transistors .ooo5 .00097 
crrors such as improper process- 
ing, handling errors, etc. Said Red- 
ler, “The fact that many defects 
have been found to be the results 
of human errors points to the need 
for more careful design reviews and 
increased quality control and qual- 
ity assurance. The parts, compo- 
nents and subsystems of complex 
space systems receive much han- 
dling and exposure to damage and 
contamination. Adequate training 
and surveillance of personnel in 
fabrication test and inspection pro- 
cedures is a must . . .” 
Redler feels physics of failure 
and physics of aging programs 
have gradually improved elec- 
tronic components in general. He 
calls for the development of 
standard screening and bum-in 
tests for space parts based on 
such physics of failure and aging 
programs. Expanded tests in inte- 
grated circuits are needed. 
Failure rates of highest reliable 
parts that can be used for estimat- 
ing reliability of electronic space 
systems were supplied by Redler 
(See table .) 
Mechanical and electromechan- 
ical parts are apt to be the limiting 
components unless more effort is 
applied to their analysis and math- 
ematical modeling for failure and 
wearout characteristics, Redler 
said. EP 
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